Changes in the politico-geographical position of Hungary in the 20th century by Hajdú, Zoltán
CENTRE FOR REGIONAL STUDIES 
OF HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
No. 22 
Changes in the Politico-geographical Position  
of Hungary in the 20th Century 
 
by 
Zoltán HAJDÚ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series editor 
Zoltán GÁL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pécs 
1998 
 Publishing of this paper is supported by the 
Research Fund of the Centre for Regional Studies, Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0238–2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 1999 by Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences 
Technical editor: Ilona Csapó, Zoltán Gál  
Typeset by Centre for Regional Studies of HAS Printed in Hungary by 
Sümegi Nyomdaipari, Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Ltd., Pécs 
 
 2 
 CONTENTS 
1 Introduction 
2 The politico-geographical position as a historically changing, relative  
category 
3 The politico-geographical position of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy  
  within Europe, the situation of Hungary within the Monarchy, 1900–1918 
a) The politico-geographical position of the Monarchy within Europe 
b) The politico-geographical position of Hungary within the Monarchy 
4 The situation of the Hungarian politico-geography in the time of the  
      transition after World War I, 1918–1920 
5 The changes of the politico-geographical position of Hungary in the period 
between the two world wars 
5.1 Relationships to the great powers 
5.2 Neighbourhood connections 
6 The dilemma of the loser Hungary and the victorious great powers,  
      1944-1948 
7 In the alliance system of the Soviet Union, 1949-1991 
7.1 The building out and questioning of the socialist alliance system, 1949–
1956 
7.2 The interaction of the home and foreign policy (Hungary as the “most 
 cheerful barrack” of the socialist camp) 
7.3 From the economic crisis through the social crisis to the political systemic 
change 
8 Hungary in the “grey zone” 
(Out of the Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON – but where?) 
9 At the door of the NATO, in the waiting room of the European Union 
9.1 At the door of the NATO 
9.2 In the waiting room of the European Union 
10 Summary 
 
 
 3 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: 
Table 2: 
Table 3:  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: The Austro–Hungarian Monarchy in 1914 
Figure 2: The division of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy and the  
succesor states 
Figure 3: The territorial division of the historical Hungary 
Figure 4: The territorial fragmentation and distribution of the Hungarian  
ethnic population, 1920 
Figure 5: The changes of the territory of Hungary, 1938 – 1947 
Figure 6: The divided Europe, 1955 
Figure 7: The allocation of the Soviet military bases in Hungary, 1989 
Figure 8: The new neighbour states of Hungary, 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 1. Introduction 
 
The geographical position describes on the one hand the global determi-
nation of a country (absolute geographical position), and its (relative) posi-
tion compared to the other countries. The politico-geographical position 
shows the place of a country in the international political space. The poli-
tico-geographical position is a category that changes in course of history and 
has a relative content and value. The judgement of the politico-geographical 
location of an individual country has changed very much both at interna-
tional and national level … 
The changes of the politico-geographical location of a country are influ-
enced by global, continental, neighbourhood and internal processes. In the 
20th century, the continental and the global processes were predominant in 
determining the politico-geographical position of almost all countries. 
The territory of Hungary and its character changed within extremely 
broad frameworks during the 20th century. When making historical analy-
ses, we always have to be aware which country borders the assessments are 
based on, because the transition processes can only be assessed realistically 
if the real situation and the real politico-geographical environment are taken 
into consideration. 
Not only the territory of Hungary, but also its status in its region, and its 
regional and continental power position changed very much during the 20th 
century. In the first period of the 20th century, Hungary was part of a Euro-
pean great power (only middle power by many opinions) which was histori-
cally determined in many respects. After 1920, Hungary became a small 
state, forced within an internationally limited sphere of action, while in the 
period of the enlargements of 1938-1941, Hungary increased in figures (ter-
ritory, population, economic performance, number of the army troops), but 
its possibilities were in reality more and more restricted by the direct influ-
ence and later control of the 3rd German Empire. 
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Following World War II, Hungary gradually integrated into the politico-
geographical structures of the divided world and the divided Europe. In 
1956, a significant part of the Hungarian population questioned this integra-
tion and also the inner structure of the country, but finally it was the interna-
tional determinations and the crude military force that created an “order” 
built on the old realities. Hungary, determined by its small size, was inte-
grated into the socialist system, above all into the economic, political and 
military structure of the Soviet Union. 
From 1988, the legitimacy of the integration into the “peace camp” was 
gradually questioned in Hungary, followed by the disintegration of the 
country from its former treaty of allied countries – which treaty changed 
fundamentally in the beginning, still it could not avoid falling apart after-
wards –, and by 1991 Hungary re-gained its sovereignty in all respects. This 
fundamental turn was allowed by the favourable internal and external condi-
tions and possibilities. 
After 1991, Hungary became part of the “grey zone” that emerged be-
tween the stable West, and the “East” (a part of the ex-socialist countries 
and the successor states of the Soviet Union), struggling with repeating cri-
ses. It was Hungary’s own decision to break away from this zone, also to 
become a member of the NATO and the European Union. The Hungarian 
population legitimised its determination for the NATO membership in a ref-
erendum. 
The politico-geographical position of Hungary and the changes of that 
can be analysed any judged in several spatial respects in any period of time: 
− within the state structure (period of the Austro–Hungarian Monar-
chy); 
− in the relationships and connections to the neighbouring states; 
− in spatial community aspect (Central Europe); 
− functional large space (“In-Between Europe”, grey zone); 
− at continental level (Europe) and 
− at the level of the global processes. 
In the individual historical situations, it was always different elements 
that were dominant. In our opinion, the politico-geographical position of 
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Hungary was mainly shaped by the global and European processes (World 
War I and World War II, and the divided, bipolar world). These macro-
structural effects determined the development of the neighbourhood envi-
ronment of Hungary (Treaty of Trianon and of Paris, the Soviet–American 
deals made in Malta). Still, in the analysis we only shortly look at these es-
sential processes and focus on the neighbourhood connections, because we 
do believe that the Hungarian public thinking has been more thoroughly 
touched by the neighbourhood connections, and because of the Hungarian 
minority living in the neighbouring countries, these neighbourhood connec-
tions still have a dominant influence on the development of our European 
politics in many respects. 
Until 1988 our analysis is mainly a summary, a review, while the proc-
esses that have passed since the systemic change are dealt with in more de-
tails. Our primary objective is the introduction of the historically changing 
politico-geographical position of Hungary, and an analysis of the adjustment 
of the country to the new global, European and neighbourhood situation 
continuously changing since the 1990s. 
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2. The politico-geographical position as a historically 
changing, relative category 
 
We have to take it as natural that each country looks at the world, the 
continent which it is in, and the neighbouring countries from its absolute 
geographical position. In the Hungarian historical and political thinking too, 
a kind of Hungarian worldview was born, in which Hungary had a central 
position. Even if not often, but a Budapest centred map of the world was 
talked about, however, that did not become a dominant element of either the 
public thinking or the school education. In the Hungarian education and 
public thinking, the Europe-centred worldview became more prevalent. 
The politico-geographical position of Hungary can be stated as a relative 
category, which has had and still has both inner and outer content and de-
termination. The inner content can be defined as the determination and ori-
entation of the values of the current political elite, or in a broader sense, the 
“neighbourhood conscience”, “sense of safety”, “spatial community con-
science” and “legitimacy of the alliance” by the whole of the society. 
The inner determinations of the politico-geographical position can be 
considerably different at the different social groups: even the leading politi-
cal elite can judge differently the directions and the content of the foreign 
orientation and the alliance connections of the country. (For example, the 
neighbourhood of the 3rd German Empire after the annexation of Austria 
had a different meaning for those who sympathised with the Germans and 
those who urged an English orientation.) It is characteristic of the Hungarian 
development that the politico-geographical position of the country and the 
favourable or unfavourable nature thereof were judged differently by the po-
litical emigrants in different periods of time and with different ideological 
backgrounds (after 1849, 1919, 1945, 1956) than by the current state power. 
The lack of a total social consensus took a special form with respect to 
the judgement of the Hungarian–Soviet “fraternal and everlasting friend-
ship” and the alliance and neighbourhood of the Soviet Union. For a signifi-
cant part of the Hungarian society, this alliance connection and obligation 
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remained unacceptable, although this aversion could not be stated and re-
vealed for several decades. 
The outer content of the politico-geographical position mainly means the 
judgement of the participation of Hungary in the neighbourhood, spatial 
community, European and global processes. The judgement of both the 
neighbours and the continental actors may change in a short time, and as it 
is proved by the Hungarian development, it has changed several times and 
radically during the 20th century. 
In the 20th century, the current Hungary adjusted itself to the European 
territorial, economic and power structure, together with its neighbours of the 
time. Hungary and its neighbourhood made the most changeable region 
within the often changing European structures. 
Hungary has existed within borders which significantly changed many 
times, and the self-definition of the geographical position of Hungary in the 
20th century has also changed very often. Hungary has already been consid-
ered as an “Eastern” and “Western”, Southeast European, Balkan, South 
European, Southwest European, Central European, Central-Eastern Euro-
pean, East-Central European etc. country (RING, É., ed. 1986 I-II.) Each 
definition of the space had direct outer and inner political elements. These 
self-defining efforts, partly co-existing in history, also showed that no con-
sensus was achieved in the Hungarian society in this respect, either. 
It is a dominant feature of the broader region of Hungary that after the 
elimination of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, it has been a buffer zone 
between the empires or great powers almost all through the 20th century. A 
dominant element here is the space of influence and the pressure of Ger-
many and Russia. In comparison with them, the rising Italian and the com-
pletely devastating Turkish power should be considered as auxiliary in im-
portance. The different imperial and power efforts were usually escorted by 
efforts concerning certain large regions and functional spatial communities. 
The perception of Hungary by the neighbours can also be problematic. 
The population, the political elite and partly the scientific life of the succes-
sor states considered Hungary not in its actual form after 1920, but they saw 
the size, significance and possibilities of Hungary before 1918. The succes-
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sor states did not really make their foreign political and alliance efforts ac-
cording to the real conditions of power. 
In the early 20th century, the state structure and the inner politico-
geographical position also developed in an incredibly complex way (within 
the historical state borders, Hungary–Croatia, and the two states of the 
Monarchy, Austria and Hungary). It was partly the debates about the inner 
structure that finally led to the significant change of the external conditions 
and the disintegration of the state structure. 
The ethnic neighbourhood environment of Hungary was quite stable in 
the 20th century, but the weight and role of some ethnic groups have sig-
nificantly changed. While the Ukrainians for example hardly played any 
role in the Hungarian processes for decades, after 1991 Ukraine became the 
most populated and from military aspects the strongest neighbour of Hun-
gary. The transition of the ethnic space was complemented by the voluntary 
and forced international migrations, and the occasionally very different 
natural movements of the different ethnic groups. 
The territorial division of the Hungarian ethnic group and nation after 
1920 basically changed the connections of the now independent Hungary to 
its neighbourhood, its bilateral inter-state connections, and the conditions of 
the foreign and national policy. The current Hungarian foreign policy had to 
give an answer, among other things, to the dividedness of the nation. 
The direct neighbourhood of the great powers (Germany 1938–1945, So-
viet Union 1945-1991) always had a dominant effect on the development of 
Hungary. The neighbourhood turned to occupation for a shorter or longer 
period in both cases. After 1945, the Soviet Union was an inner and an outer 
factor at the same time, because of the occupation (which was even legiti-
mised until 1955), and in effect it determined the possible frameworks of the 
development of Hungary. 
In the period after 1988, the inner development of Hungary was defined 
by the lasting inner crisis of the Soviet Union, its rapidly weakening world 
power and world political positions, and by the internal transformation of 
the neighbouring socialist states. This new situation offered new possibili-
ties for Hungary to change its politico-geographical position. 
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The Hungarian foreign policy always had to consider the facts coming 
from the absolute politico-geographical position of the country (BALOGH, 
S. 1986; HERCZEGH, G. 1986; JUHÁSZ, GY. 1969; SZÛRÖS, M. 1985, 
1987), as well as the rearrangement processes going on at global, continen-
tal and neighbourhood level (KENNEDY, P. 1992; FISCHER, F. 1992, 
1996; ROURKE, J. T. 1991; LENDVAI, É. F. 1997). We could as well 
draw the conclusions from the historical failures or even tragedies of the 
20th century Hungarian state–national–foreign policy that the Hungarian 
foreign policy was almost always wrong, almost always misjudged the long-
term development of the external conditions – but this judgement would 
only be part of the truth. Most of the neighbouring countries also experi-
enced the tragedies of the 20th century, so it is rather regional and continen-
tal features than individual problems (the incompetence or lack of authority 
of the politicians, maybe foreign politicians of the individual countries). 
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3. The politico-geographical position of the Austro–
Hungarian Monarchy within Europe, the situation of Hun-
gary within the Monarchy, 1900–1918 
 
Because of the complicated state structure, our analysis must contain at 
least two (and introversive and an extroversive) approaches. The Austro–
Hungarian Monarchy seemed to be and acted as a single unit “outwards”, to 
Europe and the world, at the same time, the state structure was often debated 
from the inside, both by the two major nations making the state and by the 
minorities. The economic and military performance, and the political effec-
tiveness and stability of the Monarchy was considerably weaker than in the 
case of countries with a more homogeneous ethnic composition. Inside, the 
signs of the lack of the unity already appeared in many respects. 
 
3.1 The politico-geographical position of the Monarchy within 
Europe 
 
Europe on the turn of the 19th and 20th century showed the results of the 
long-term historical processes and the consequences of the extremely inten-
sive and influential rearrangement processes of the last third of the 19th cen-
tury. The state policies and philosophies of the modern state building, and 
the traditional dynastic approach co-existed and influenced each other in the 
alliance-making efforts of the individual states (POUNDS, N. J. G. 1997). 
Europe in the beginning of the 20th century was the Europe of the his-
torical empires and the large countries. The Monarchy in the beginning of 
the 20th century was a traditional, historically accepted great power, and 
considered as a participant in shaping the European processes, being part of 
the European balance of power. The Monarchy, despite its colonisation ef-
forts, remained a basically European, inland power, without a real weight in 
world politics. 
Considering its territory, the Monarchy was the second largest country in 
Europe (676 443 km2), following Russia. The centre of the territory of the 
Monarchy was the Vienna–Budapest axis, thus the country was called the 
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“Danubian Monarchy” by many. The Monarchy, although it had an Adriatic 
coast of significant length, important ports and a considerable fleet, could 
still be taken as an inland power. 
By population, the Monarchy was the third country in Europe (with 51 
million inhabitants), after Russia and Germany. The population of the Mon-
archy was extremely complex, neither state founding nations (the Germans 
or the Hungarians) had a dominant weight within the whole of the Monar-
chy, in fact, within their own countries. 
The economic performance of the Monarchy within Europe was lower 
than its weight by territory or population. The modernisation of the econ-
omy was belated compared to England, France or Germany, also, it had a 
specific structure. Compared to Russia, the Monarchy had a competitive, 
modern economic structure. 
The European and neighbourhood environment of the Monarchy showed 
both favourable and unfavourable characters in 1914 (Figure 1.). Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Germany, Russia, Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro and the 
Adriatic Sea meant different historical connections and experiences, and the 
neighbourhood contained versatile possibilities and constraints. 
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The sphere of action of the foreign policy depends on the objectives, val-
ues, directions and value system defined by the leading elite. A foreign pol-
icy option for the Monarchy was offered by the connections to Germany, 
Russia, or Italy, also, the closeness to the marginal powers from geographi-
cal aspect, above all Turkey, and the relationship and connections with the 
European great powers marginal in the geographical sense of the word 
(Great Britain and France), and the rising USA. 
The foreign policy objectives and orientation of the two dominants, state-
forming nations of the Monarchy were different in almost all neighbourhood 
relations. (The judgement of the neighbourhood of Switzerland and Liech-
tenstein was not different in the Austrian and Hungarian foreign policy ap-
proach.) 
Italy was a potential ally and an enemy at the same time. The French–
Italian and the Italian–English connections were largely influenced by the 
competition for the colonies in Africa. For Italy, the basic issue was the op-
timisation of the European and colonisation efforts. For the Austrians, the 
birth of the single, united Italy, and the gradual displacement of Austria 
from Italy was a historical loss and grievance. The 1882 triple treaty of 
Germany, Italy and Austria–Hungary satisfied the minimum needs of all 
contracting parties, but the Italian claim for Trieste and its environs and for 
other territories complicated the connections immediately. There was no 
conflict concerning territorial claims, or any other interest conflict between 
the Hungarian party and Italy, in fact, because of the fact that Italy gave 
home to Lajos Kossuth in his exile, the majority of the Hungarian society 
felt sympathy, hope and respect for Turin for decades. In World War I, Italy 
finally fought against the Central Powers, and although the military role of 
Italy was not really dominant, it sometimes absorbed significant forces. 
Germany, created with the leadership of Prussia, from an enemy gradu-
ally became the most important ally for Austria. The friendship of the Aus-
trians towards Germany is based on linguistic and cultural grounds, and af-
ter getting over the shock caused by the creation of the Little German Unity, 
the country was open towards the new German Empire. For the Austrians, 
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the relationship to Germany for a long time depended on the often changing 
conditions of the relationship to France, Italy and Russia. For the Hungarian 
party, the relationship to Germany was not so important in itself, rather in 
the light of the German–Russian relationship and the connections between 
the Hungarians and Russia. Germany finally shaped its alliances and exter-
nal relations according to its own interests. Although a dominant force of 
the Central Powers, Germany proved to be weak in the prolonged World 
War I. 
Russia, by its assistance given for the repression the Hungarian war of 
independence in 1849, achieved the sympathy of the Austrians, while the 
same action evoked a long-term hatred in the Hungarians against Russia. In 
the relationship between the Monarchy and Russia, the potential alliance, 
the neutral co-existence as competitors, and the possibility of becoming 
enemies of each other were all present. Both the Monarchy and Russia (to-
gether with Germany) were interested in the division and the further inva-
sion of Poland, so this common interest could as well have made them stra-
tegic allies for each other (the alliance of the three emperors). Finally, the 
relationship between the Monarchy and Russia turned to hostility, due to the 
competition in the Balkan area. During the events and battles of World War 
I, the Monarchy proved to be weak against Russia, and was only able to 
“hold” the Russian front with the assistance of Germany. The revolution in 
1917 brought fundamental changes in almost all respects, both in the situa-
tion of Russia and the politics of Europe. 
The relationship between the Monarchy and Rumania was determined by 
the dual and often changing interests and relationships of the latter state. In 
1883, Rumania allied with the Monarchy, in a fear of the Russians, then it 
more and more openly stated its territorial claims towards the Monarchy, 
above all Hungary. In the middle of World War I, Rumania clearly became 
an enemy, it was defeated and forced to sign a separate peace treaty, still, at 
the end of the war, Rumania found itself among the winners. 
The connection between the Monarchy and Serbia was mostly a definite 
hostility, mainly depending on the development of the relationship of the 
Monarchy to Russia. There were huge differences between the two countries 
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in all respects. The opposition of the Monarchy and Serbia led to the chain 
reaction of the declarations of war in World War I. Serbia then became one 
of the biggest winners of World War I, if we look at its territorial gains. 
The neighbourhood connection between the Monarchy and Montenegro 
was determined by the economic dependence of the latter, but this small 
state often received an interest exceeding its weight. During the world war, 
Montenegro became a military enemy of the Monarchy. 
By the Adriatic Sea, the Monarchy was considered as an inland-sea 
power, but it never became a real sea power. The Adriatic Sea was impor-
tant in merchant shipping, only. Both the biggest port of the Adriatic Sea 
(Trieste) and the only important seaport of Hungary (Fiume/Rijeka) had 
significant turnovers. 
The relationship between the Monarchy and Turkey was often burdened 
with conflicts, because of Bosnia–Herzegovina (1878, 1908) and the so-
called Sanjak area. Later, because of the location of the new states created 
by the achievements of the national movements in the Balkans, Turkey 
ceased to be a direct neighbour of the Monarchy. However, because of their 
common interests, they related to each other as “close neighbours”, because 
of the Balkans. Turkey finally joined the war on the side of the central pow-
ers. The fear of Turkey of the Russian extension was bigger than its aver-
sion towards the increase of the weight of the Monarchy in the Balkan area. 
The relationship between the Monarchy and the geographically periph-
eral great powers (Great Britain and France) was contradictory both before 
and after the turn of the century. The connections were determined by the 
mutual and multilateral relationships to Germany and Russia, then the sup-
port for the nationalist movements aiming at the secession from the Monar-
chy became the focal point of the debates. There were no insoluble, direct 
oppositions between the Monarchy and the two sea powers; still, they were 
confronted during the world war, because of the power politics and the 
complex interests of the alliances. 
The leading elite of the Monarchy did not recognise the growing impor-
tance of the USA in the world economy and the world politics. The Monar-
chy only attributed a secondary importance to the USA, while the Czech na-
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tionalist movement, which aimed at the secession from the Monarchy, was 
probably among the first ones to realise the probable future role and possi-
bilities of the States. The USA entered the war primarily not because of its 
bilateral connection to the Monarchy, but driven by European and global 
power aspects. 
In World War I, Germany, the Monarchy and their allies entering the war 
later (Bulgaria and Turkey) were defeated by the Entente powers, even more 
by the United States of America that joined the war with new forces. The 
war, that was unjust and imperialistic on both sides and aimed at the territo-
rial re-division of the world and Europe, finished a historical period and at 
the same time initiated new processes. 
With the defeat in 1918, the disintegration process of the Monarchy ac-
celerated within a short time (Figure 2.). A dominant element in this disin-
tegration process was the change in the external conditions (in the eyes of 
the English, the Monarchy lost its significance in the European balance of 
power, the 14 points of the American president, Wilson were about a new 
order), as well as the internal transition, the national rearrangement process. 
By the tearing apart of the Monarchy, the system of small states was cre-
ated in Central Europe, and at the same time a political and power vacuum 
in the Danubian region, which the French tried to fill out. However, neither 
their economic nor their political weight was sufficient for a long-term in-
fluence on the whole of the region. 
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3.2 The politico-geographical position of Hungary within the Monar-
chy 
 
The Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, created by the Compromise of 1867, 
was a complex state formation comprehended differently by the political 
elite of the contracting parties and sometime by their governments, too. The 
Hungarian political elite was divided about the issue of the mission of the 
Monarchy, within that, about the interests of Hungary. The “dispute of pub-
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lic law” continuously had a significant influence on the Hungarian home 
policy. 
In the 20th century, the inner political–territorial structures of the Monar-
chy were made even more complicated by the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Hungarian leading political circles objected to the an-
nexation, later demanded that once it was done, the territory be annexed, by 
historical right, to the Hungarian Crown. 
Hungary can only be considered as a political formation with a partial in-
dependence, a limited sovereignty within the Monarchy. In foreign affairs, 
military and security policy issues Hungary was not independent, however, 
it had a complete autonomy as regarded home affairs. 
The Act on the Compromise, taking the separate situation of Hungary 
into consideration, talked of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia as parts of the 
Hungarian Crown, but Dalmatia was under Austrian reign all through the 
dualist period. (Within the Hungarian politico-geography, a separate school, 
the so-called “geography of public law” was created for the geographical 
analysis of the Hungarian connections to Austria and for the study of the 
pending territorial issues.) 
Both in the Hungarian politics and the Hungarian science, especially in 
the politico-geography, a kind of conscious, proudly accepted and an-
nounced imperialistic effort could be seen (HAVASS, R. 1902). This Hun-
garian imperialism, which was seen as having a positive content at that time, 
saw the civilisation of the Balkans as its primary mission. 
In accordance with the official statistical definition of the time, the 
“Hungarian Empire”, after the Hungarian–Croatian compromise and the 
embourgeoisment of the frontier region, consisted of Croatia–Slavonia as 
genuine associate countries, the port of Fiume and its environs, as a separate 
body annexed to the Hungarian Crown, and the Motherland. The Hungarian 
politico-geography treated Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as “non-
united associate states” (LÓCZY, L. ed. 1918). 
The historical Hungary in itself was considerable by European standards 
with its territory of 325 411 km2. As an independent state, Hungary would 
have been the 6th biggest state in Europe. Considering its size and topog-
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raphical position, it was actually the historical Hungary that maintained the 
spatial unity of the Monarchy, as it was larger in territory than the Austrian 
part without Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
By population, Hungary with its 20.8 million inhabitants would have 
been the 7th most populated country in Europe in 1910. The number of 
population was significantly lower than in the Austrian territories, and the 
low population density (64 persons/km2) was especially striking. The real 
political problem was the heterogeneous ethnic composition of the popula-
tion. The proportion of those with Hungarian mother language did not reach 
50% in the whole of the Hungarian Empire (48.1%), and even in the Moth-
erland in the narrower sense, the share of the Hungarians hardly exceeded 
50% (54.5%). Only 57.4% of the population of the Hungarian Empire spoke 
Hungarian, thus the proportion of the population speaking Hungarian was 
less than 10% more than the share of those with Hungarian as mother 
tongue. In Croatia–Slavonia, despite the 900 years of common history of the 
states, only 6.5% of the population spoke Hungarian. The number and share 
of the ethnic minorities was more significant along the state borders, and for 
the majority of them, the attraction of the (Rumanian, Serb) nation states on 
the other side of the border was tempting. The centrifugal forces gradually 
strengthened in political sense, and these forces could only be counter-
balanced by the centripetal forces in the times of peace. 
The major parts of the borders of the historical Hungary were so-called 
internal borders, towards the Austrian territories. Hungary only had interna-
tional, external borders to Rumania and Serbia, although the border to Ser-
bia was at the same time the border of the most delicate political conflicts of 
interest of the Monarchy. 
Economically, Hungary was in a special situation within the Monarchy, 
because its territory was the richest part of the Monarchy in minerals, and its 
natural resources were the most important. However, its economic perform-
ance, looking at the real division of production, did not reach the weight and 
volume of the Austrian territories, although the lagging behind of Hungary 
gradually decreased. Because of the belated development, several sectors of 
the Hungarian industry were significantly more up to date than the industry 
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in the Austrian territories. As regards agriculture, Hungary became the 
Monarchy’s granary, after the anti-inundation works and the regulation of 
the rivers. 
Politically, the representation of Hungary as whole was weak, as the 
dominant factor of the politics was the weight of the ruler. Francis Joseph– 
who was the Austrian emperor and the Hungarian king in one person – 
played a dominant role in the formation of the policy, especially the foreign 
policy of the Monarchy, in addition to the legal structures of the constitu-
tional monarchy – or sometimes opposite to them. 
As regards foreign policy, in certain periods of the dualism, the Hungar-
ian interests, then considered as of primary importance, were asserted. At 
the same time, we have to know that the Hungarian prime minister (István 
Tisza), who opposed to the war (in a fear that the unfavourable outcome of 
the war would jeopardise the unity of the country), could not prevent the 
declaration of war on Serbia. A significant part of the Hungarian elite rec-
ognised that the interest of Hungary was the maintenance of the status quo 
and not the questioning of that. 
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IV. The situation of the Hungarian politico-geography in 
the time of the transition after World War I, 1918–1920 
 
With the military defeat and the starting disintegration of the Monarchy, 
the historical Hungary found itself in a new situation. The most important 
issues were how Hungary was able to “come out” from the Monarchy, on 
the one hand, and the collapse caused by the world war, on the other. 
The civil democratic revolution of 1918 (the so-called “Daisy Revolu-
tion”, October 1918) declared the secession of Hungary from Austria, then 
the republic was announced. The new leadership at the same time attempted 
to preserve the territorial integrity of the historical Hungary. These efforts 
were unsuccessful: among the ethnic minorities of the historical Hungary, 
the Croats were the first to announce their secession from Hungary, fol-
lowed by the Slovaks and then the Rumanians. 
The acquisition of the independence and the restoration of the state sov-
ereignty began in an extremely tough situation, within very difficult condi-
tions: war defeat, lack of separate, independent foreign affairs and military 
affairs, the secession efforts of the ethnic minorities, worsening relation-
ships to the neighbouring countries and the winning European great powers, 
the opposition to the USA, the objective conflict between the Hungarian na-
tional goals and the 14 points declared by the president of America. 
Mihály Károlyi, as the president of the new Republic of Hungary, tried to 
create a new, entente-friendly foreign policy orientation from the autumn of 
1918. Károlyi had to experience that, apart from his own personal political 
contacts, the new Hungary had no real contacts towards the winning great 
powers. The winning great powers saw as their primary objective the restric-
tion of the spatial connections and the role of Germany (after 1917, the So-
viet-Russian threat was also occasionally mentioned). In this objective, a 
range of the new successor states fitted much more than perhaps the surviv-
ing historical Hungary. 
The peace conference seating in Paris in January 1919 found an inter-
nally disintegrated Hungary, helpless in all respects and unable to assert its 
interests. Mihály Károlyi did not wish to accept the memorandum contain-
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ing the decisions of the peace conference, which ordered the evacuation of 
the Hungarian territories East to the Tisza river, he resigned instead. 
After the Communist take-over in March 1919, the leaders of the Hun-
garian Soviet Republic sought the strategic alliance of Soviet-Russia. This 
orientation could not receive a broad support by the majority of the Hungar-
ian society. The political views, values and objectives of the Communist 
central power and those of the majority of the society were essentially oppo-
site to each other. 
In spite of the temporary military achievements (the re-occupation of the 
major part of Upper Northern Hungary), the events of the internal civil war, 
the invasion of Hungary by different foreign powers (Czechs, Serbs, Ruma-
nians, French) in August 1919 created a hopeless situation that left ex-
tremely strong marks in the Hungarian public thinking. The most shocking 
experience was the marching in of the Rumanian troops into Budapest, and 
the Rumanian invasion (ROMSICS I., ed. 1998). 
The short period following the war raised a host of tasks and challenges 
(the task of creating the independent state existence, decision on the basic 
issues of the socio-economic arrangement, formation of the new foreign pol-
icy orientation), to which the Hungarian society sought the solution in ex-
tremes, to a large extent because of the winning great powers and their allies 
in the neighbouring states, and the communist effort of take-over and its 
failure. 
The Horthy-system, shaping from the autumn of 1919 and then consoli-
dating, signed the Trianon peace treaty concluding World War I in the 
summer of 1920, partly because of its own external legitimacy, but more 
importantly under the weight of the external constraints and forces. In ac-
cordance with the peace treaty, Hungary lost approximately two-thirds of its 
former territory and population (Figure 3., Table 1.). The tragedy of the 
peace treaty was further exacerbated by the fact that some one-third of the 
Hungarian ethnic population was now outside the new Hungarian borders 
(Figure 4.). 
The peace treaty of Trianon created a state territory without historical 
preliminaries and geographical bases. The new borders of Hungary did not 
 23
coincide with the previous border in a single point. Hungary became, from a 
basin-country, a country in the bottom of a basin, and the living space of the 
Hungarian ethnic population was divided according to the interests of the 
successor states. 
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5 The changes of the politico-geographical position of Hungary in the 
period between the two world wars 
 
The Trianon Peace Treaty, the Sopron referendum and the minor territo-
rial exchanges created a new Hungary, under international control and strict 
military supervision. Hungary became one of the weakest states in the re-
gion. In the new Europe and new neighbourhood environment the new 
Hungary had to get used to the military supervision, the insignificance in 
power, the helplessness and the consequences coming from being a small 
state. (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
 
Hungary and neighbouring countries, 1923 
 
Country Territory (km2) Population 
(million) 
Population 
density 
(head/km2
Number of 
Hungarians 
(thousand) 
Hungary 93010 8.5 92 7,147 
Austria 83833 6.5 78 10,400 
Czechoslovakia 14394 13.6 97 702,000 
Romania 294267 16.2 55 1,481 
Yugoslavia 248987 11.9 48 457,000 
 
 
In the period between the two wars, the Hungarian society and politics 
were filled with the awareness of the unfairness of the Trianon arrange-
ments. The Hungarian society could not resign itself to the new structures. 
In the life of Hungary between the two word wars, the morally declared and 
socially legitimized goal (the territorial revision) and the foreign policy or-
dered to this goal were confronted with the European power and neighbour-
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hood realities. The states of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania 
and Yugoslavia) were each much stronger in military respect than Hungary. 
The aspects of the territorial revision in between the two world wars al-
most exclusively determined the foreign policy of Hungary, including the 
relationship with the great powers and the neighbourhood connections. In 
this period, the connections to the great powers and the neighbourhood con-
nections were partly overlapping, as both Germany and the Soviet Union 
became neighbour states to Hungary. 
 
a) Relationships to the great powers 
 
The rearrangements of the world economy and the world power in the 
period between the two world wars affected the situation and possibilities of 
Hungary in a versatile and contradictory way. Despite the different attempts 
and efforts, it became more and more obvious that the winners of World 
War I were not interested (neither the big nor the small ones) in the peaceful 
revision of the forced and dictated peace treaty. Hungary, if it wanted to 
achieve its stated objectives, almost necessarily had to be on that side which 
questioned the European power and territorial structures created in Paris. 
In the international and European political system, the League of the Na-
tions had an important position, despite all of its problems. Hungary could 
only join after accepting the Trianon Peace Treaty, in September 1922, but 
did not become a major actor in the organisation (in April 1939, Hungary 
quit the League). The League of the Nations was seen as a negative creation 
by the contemporary Hungarian public opinion. This organisation was re-
sponsible for controlling the observance of the peace treaty, on the other 
hand, Hungary gradually got the possibility to demand that the rights stated 
in the peace treaty and guaranteed for the Hungarian minorities be kept by 
the successor states. 
In the inter-war period, a new element in the political thinking and prac-
tice was the organising role of the ideological “values”: fascism in Italy, 
Stalinism in the Soviet Union, national-socialism in Germany, besides the 
former ideological values, such as liberalism and conservatism in Great 
 27
Britain, the USA and France. The ideological interests and real politics 
many times conflicted in the relationships of the great powers to each other. 
The Hungarian relationships to Italy were mainly determined by the fact 
that Italy was the first great power to demand officially the review of the 
peace treaty made in Paris, including the “just peace for Hungary”. The sup-
port of the Italian diplomacy allowed the referendum in Sopron, as a conse-
quence of which Sopron and its area were given back to Hungary (in De-
cember 1921). The Hungarian–Italian connections became more and more 
versatile, which finally led to the making of the friendship pact between the 
two countries in April 1927. 
In March 1934, the Italian–Hungarian–Austrian agreement was signed, 
which prescribed a preliminary consultation in issues of common interest. 
Also, the mutual deepening of trading connections was supported. The mak-
ing of this treaty revealed a kind of fear of the expected efforts by Hitler’s 
Germany. In April 1935, Italy made a statement at the international forum 
which said that after the remilitarization of Germany, Hungary too should 
have equal rights to arming. In 1936, the Italian–Hungarian–Austrian con-
tracts were reinforced, which implied a kind of hostility toward Czechoslo-
vakia and the Soviet Union then. Italy assisted the Hungarian revisionist ef-
forts first in 1938, then in 1940, with the 1st and 2nd Vienna Awards, re-
spectively. Wide layers of the Hungarian society felt sympathy for Italy, 
which did not primarily mean sympathy for fascism, rather for the Italian 
state for its support of the revisionist demands of Hungary. 
The German–Hungarian connections were quite different in the two peri-
ods of the inner development of Germany (the Weimar and the Hitlerian 
Germany). Germany before 1933 was a significant partner mainly only in 
the field of economy, without a major political weight and impact on the 
Hungarian efforts, while Germany after 1933 was more and more a direct 
political and power factor for Hungary. In the Hungarian historical thinking, 
attempts were made to have the “first and last henchman” approaches be-
lieved simultaneously (ZSIGMOND, L. ed., 1966), which could hardly be 
corrected even after several decades (VARGA, J., 1991, 1992). 
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Germany’s effect was especially strengthened by the Anschluss (Novem-
ber 1938), as it became a direct neighbour to Hungary, and would have put 
its whole economic and military weight on Hungary, whatever foreign pol-
icy Hungary would have pursued. Hungary was mesmerised by the success 
of the territorial revision, however, it became more and more obvious that 
the Germans, given the new situation and conditions of power, were not in-
terested in the complete Hungarian revision and were only willing to sup-
port the Hungarian territorial demands until the ethnic borders. (Hungary 
had a “historical” territorial claim towards Germany, because of Bur-
genland, also, towards its other ally, Italy, because of the port town of 
Fiume.) 
Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in January 1939. (This act gave 
the Hungarian foreign policy a clear ideological content.) The anti-Soviet at-
titude of the leading Hungarian politicians was even stronger than the de-
mand for the territorial revision. (The Hungarian political leadership did not 
wish to gain territories in collaboration with the Soviet Union.) 
In March 1939, the Hungarian Army – with the approval of Germany – 
reoccupied the Sub-Carpathians, and reached the historical borders of the 
country. However, this territorial enlargement could not be justified by eth-
nographic arguments. 
The Hungarian foreign policy was surprised by the German–Soviet col-
laboration in the division of Poland (September 1939). In the beginning of 
World War II, it became clearer than ever for the Hungarian leading elite 
that the ideological approach and the great power policy do not necessarily 
follow the same principles. Hungary did not have a direct military role in 
the conflict, however, it gave shelter to the large number of Polish refugees 
arriving at the country. 
In August 1940, the arbitration of Germany and Italy gave North Tran-
sylvania back to Hungary. This territorial increase was one of the main ele-
ments that made Hungary join the three-power pact, in which Germany, It-
aly and Japan delimited their spheres of interest. 
In the spring of 1941, Germany attacked Yugoslavia – partly moving 
through the Hungarian territory –, then, after the formal elimination of 
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Yugoslavia, Hungary also took military actions in order to defend the Hun-
garian minorities. 
In June, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. (The struggle between the 
two great power neighbours of Hungary affected the whole of Europe, rear-
ranging the power relations.) The war brought about a new situation in 
Hungary in all aspects, and the sphere of action of the Hungarian foreign 
policy became rather tight. Hungary, referring to the bombing in Kassa (the 
now Košice) – the circumstances of which are still argued – joined the inva-
sion against the Soviet Union. (The Soviet Union considered the support of 
the territorial claims of Hungary in Transylvania, provided Hungary did not 
declare war on the Soviet Union.) This way Hungary became a directly in-
volved party in a global and continental fight, on the outcome of which it 
could not have any influence at all. 
After 1941, Germany, with its invasions, practically surrounded Hun-
gary, and Hungary now was completely at the mercy of Germany in all re-
spects. During the war, the Hungarian economy was integrated in almost all 
respects into the frameworks of the German war economy and the new 
German European order (UNKE, H. et al. n. d.). 
On 19 March 1944, Germany seized the Hungarian territory, and used the 
human and financial resources of Hungary for its own war purposes. Hun-
gary was thus not an independent state any more in the final phase of the 
war. 
The relationship of Hungary and Great Britain was not overshadowed by 
historical conflicts, and the Hungarian public opinion only blamed Great 
Britain in the second place for the Trianon Peace Treaty. The relationship 
between the two countries was defined by the interest conflict and the dif-
ferent opinions about the Central European situation. 
The negotiation between Germany and Great Britain in the autumn of 
1938 considered Hungary inasmuch as the acceptance of the German territo-
rial claims – implicitly – meant that Great Britain did not consider the terri-
torial claims of Hungary against Czechoslovakia as a “tearing test”, and an 
occasional revision would not have conflicted with the English interests. 
 30
Great Britain later recognized the results of the Hungarian territorial revi-
sions. 
Pál Teleki’s government was consciously trying after 1938 to decrease 
the overweight of the Germans and maintain the connections to Great Brit-
ain. The attack of Germany against Yugoslavia and the Hungarian collabo-
ration only resulted in the disconnection of the diplomatic relations on the 
part of Great Britain, despite the threats of the declaration of war. It was the 
Hungarian declaration of war on the Soviet Union and the attack against the 
country that made Great Britain declare war on Hungary. 
The Hungarian–French relationships were basically determined by the 
role of France in the creation of the Trianon Peace Treaty. France could not 
get over the web of its Central European efforts and illusions (as the domi-
nant supporter of the Little Entente, its main objective was the preservation 
of the status quo created by the peace treaty), also, Hungary was unable to 
forget the shock of Trianon. In 1925, the two countries made a trade con-
tract based on the principle of greatest commercial allowance. 
The French foreign policy consistently and consciously supported 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania against Hungary. The different 
French interests concerning Hungary and Romania were reflected in the 
contracts made with the two countries: France made a contract with Roma-
nia that contained obligation of support and relieve, while “only” made a 
friendship and non-aggression pact with Hungary (June 1926). 
In the early 1930s, the French government made an attempt to develop 
the co-operation of the Danubian states, but the French possibilities shrank 
to the minimum after Hitler took over in Germany. France was rapidly 
pushed out of the region both economically and politically. 
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Hungary was defined by 
the transformations of the international political system, the ideological op-
position, the avowed anti-Sovietism of the Hungarian leaders and the inter-
nal policy of Hungary. The Hungarian–Soviet relationship was heavily bur-
dened by the historical experiences of the Hungarian elite in force about the 
communists, collected during the period of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. 
The connections between the two countries were determined by the anti-
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Communist attitude of the Hungarian government in the whole period. Par-
ticular businesses were occasionally made between Hungary and the Soviet 
Union (the issue and exchange of the communists arrested in Hungary and 
the war prisoners kept in Soviet-Russia). 
Hungary was reluctant to recognize the Soviet Union (September 1924), 
and the complete settling of the diplomatic relations was prolonged, for 
home political reasons. The Hungarian leading class was almost never able 
to conduct a real politics towards the Soviet Union. 
After September 1939, along the former Hungarian–Polish border, the 
Soviet Union became a neighbour state to Hungary. The neighbourhood re-
lationship raised the issue of making a trading contract between the two 
countries. The agreement signed in 1940 settled the basic issues of the eco-
nomic, transport etc. relationship between the Soviet Union and Hungary. 
The declaration of war on the Soviet Union was a historical mistake of 
Hungary, a misjudgement of the interests and the power relations. In addi-
tion, this step not only made Hungary an enemy of the Soviet Union but also 
that of Great Britain. 
The development of the relationships between the USA and Hungary was 
promoted by the fact that the Senate of the USA did not ratify the Trianon 
Peace Treaty, instead, it made a separate peace treaty with Hungary in Au-
gust 1921. The public opinion of the USA recognized some injustices of the 
Trianon Peace Treaty. In April 1924, the two countries made a friendship, 
trading and consular agreement. The USA, because of its strengthening iso-
lationism, could not become the representative of the Hungarian interests. 
The economic connections between the two countries were significant for 
Hungary. In 1939, the USA had the 7th, in 1940 already the 3rd position in 
the import of Hungary. 
In December 1941, because of the mechanical constraints of the alliance 
relations, Hungary declared war on the USA, although there were no bilat-
eral problems of any kind between the two countries. This declaration of 
war by Hungary was a splendid example of a foreign political action that 
was irrational from the aspect of the national interests and derived from the 
alliance connections. 
 32
During World War II, Hungary thus declared war on both of the future 
super powers. The logic of Hungary’s alliance connections with and align-
ments to the axis powers resulted in such a historical mistake of roles and 
power relations which Hungary was unable to solve after the war, in con-
nection with either of the super powers. 
 
 
b) Neighbourhood connections 
 
The beginning of the period was characterised by the complete isolation 
of Hungary, partly because of the joint efforts of the Little Entente (after 
March 1921: Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia), and partly because 
of the specific Burgenland-policy of Austria. In the field of bilateral connec-
tions, the first step forward was made towards Austria, followed by Yugo-
slavia at the end of the inter-war period. The Czechoslovakian–Hungarian 
and the Romanian–Hungarian relationships remained tense all through this 
historical era. 
Starting in 1938, Hungary gradually eliminated the territorial structures 
created in Trianon, with the support or recognition of the great powers. 
Hungary’s neighbourhood environment, politico-geographical position and 
sphere of action in foreign policy continuously changed, and its neighbour-
hood radically changed before and during World War II (Figure 5.). It is a 
tragedy and at the same time the irony of this age that the enlarged Hungary 
was more and more pressed by the neighbourhood, territory and power of 
Germany. 
The Hungarian–Austrian connections had totally new political, economic 
and territorial conditions after the rearrangements following World War I. 
The relationship between the two countries was burdened not only by the 
conflicts deriving from the common historical past, but also the international 
settling of the borders after the war. The majority of the population of Bur-
genland spoke German as mother tongue, but this was the only place along 
the Hungarian borders where the nationality boundaries were applied when 
drawing the state borders. 
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As a result of the complicated situation that emerged in the area (the 
Hungarian aristocracy and the nationalists wanted to create an independent 
state called Lajta Banate), the acquisition of the territory became problem-
atic. The Czechoslovakian and the Serbian government promised an armed 
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support to Austria for the occupation of West Hungary, which it did not 
wish to use. 
In December 1921, at the Sopron referendum, Sopron and its environ-
ment decided upon belonging to Hungary. The political connections of the 
two countries gradually improved. A kind of conscience of interdependence 
appeared in the two, now small, states. This was important especially for 
Hungary, since Austria was the only free access to Europe for Hungary. 
In January 1931, the Hungarian–Austrian friendship pact was signed. The 
connections of the two countries were gradually integrated into the triple al-
liance made with the Italians. The triple collaboration could not stop Ger-
many’s efforts to annex Austria. 
The relationship of Hungary and Czechoslovakia was defined by an op-
position in the whole of the inter-war period. The situation of the Hungarian 
minority – although it was the best among the successor states – and the de-
clared territorial demands of Hungary almost paralysed the inter-state con-
nections. 
The Munich Pact, signed by four powers in September 1938 (Great Brit-
ain, France, Germany and Italy), decided that the Hungarian–
Czechoslovakian issue be settled bilaterally, allowing a three-month period 
for the two parties to come to an agreement. In October, the negotiations be-
tween the two parties started, but they could not agree upon the line of the 
common border. With the 1st Vienna Award, Hungary reached its goals, 
with the exception of the towns of Pozsony (the now Bratislava) and Nyitra 
(the now Nitra). 
The Slovaks first declared their autonomy on 6. October 1938, then also 
their secession from the Czechs on 14. March 1939. Carpathian Ukraine de-
clared its independence on 14. March, too. With these internal decisions, 
Czechoslovakia, created in Trianon, ceased to exist as regarded international 
law. 
The relationship of Hungary to the new Slovakia was basically not better 
than the relationships had been between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In 
Slovakia (its territory was 38 116 km2, its population 2.6 million people), 
the number of the Hungarian minority decreased to a large extent, some 100 
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000 Hungarian ethnic population remained as fragments in the territory of 
the new country. In the spring of 1939, Slovakia made a 25-year military 
contract with Germany, in which Germany accepted to protect the new bor-
ders and represent the foreign political interests of Slovakia. Slovakia in re-
ality functioned as a puppet state of Germany. In the formation of its inner 
structures it followed the example of Germany. 
When in March 1939 Hungary invaded the territory of Sub-Carpathia 
with a unilateral military action, this action almost led to a war between 
Hungary and Slovakia. On 24. March 1939, Slovak planes bombed the town 
of Ungvár that now belonged to Hungary. The two countries, on German 
pressure, ended the open hostility, and agreed on the exact state borders in 
April. 
The relationship of Hungary to Romania was determined by the fact that 
Romania received the largest territory and population in the Trianon Peace 
Treaty, and the largest number of Hungarian ethnic minority, partly living in 
one single block, was also there. 
In territory, Romania was almost three times bigger than Hungary after 
Trianon, also, its population and economic performance significantly ex-
ceeded that of Hungary. In military respect, Romania had an overwhelming 
advantage over Hungary. Romania actually became a regional middle power 
in the period between the two world wars. 
The Hungarian–Romanian economic connections were defined by the 
political relations. The Hungarian import exceeded the export all the time. 
The Hungarian export to Romania showed the features of a developed coun-
try. 
In August 1940, Hungary defined its open territorial claims against Ro-
mania in a memorandum. The bilateral negotiations did not bring any result. 
Romania asked for arbitration, and the 2nd Vienna Award gave North Tran-
sylvania back to Hungary. This decision did not solve the connections of the 
two countries, in fact, it made them even more complicated in many re-
spects, and both of them were more and more looking for the favour of 
Germany. 
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The relationship between Hungary and Yugoslavia was almost always 
tense between the two world wars, deriving from the consequences of the 
breaking out of World War I and the tensions of the ethnic minority issues. 
Hungary now was a terrestrial country, without any seacoast, and its access 
to the seas was under Yugoslav control both on the Danube river and to-
wards the Adriatic Sea. (Rijeka belonged to Italy after 1924.) 
In 1934, the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles made the rela-
tionship between the two countries even tenser, as Yugoslavia accused 
Hungary of supporting the Croatian assassins. 
Italy made attempts from 1939 to alleviate the Hungarian–Yugoslav 
problems and to settle the relationship between the two states. In December 
1940, the Hungarian–Yugoslav friendship pact was signed. The pact offered 
a basis for new relationships for the two countries, carrying the possibilities 
of the long-term reconciliation. The pact was compatible with both the cur-
rent German and Italian interests. 
After the inner turn in Yugoslavia in 1941, the relationship between 
Hungary and Yugoslavia became tense again. After the making of the So-
viet–Yugoslav friendship pact, Yugoslavia became the enemy of Hungary 
again. A part of the German troops marched through Hungary against 
Yugoslavia. Hungary only interfered later, after the former elimination of 
the Trianon-made Yugoslavia, and seized a part of its historical territories. 
Croatia declared its independence on 10. April 1941, legally eliminating 
this way the Yugoslavia made in Trianon. Croatia then had a territory of 125 
000 km2 and a population of 7 million people. It was not the historical terri-
tory of the country, but a much larger area, integrating Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
too. 
The ethnic and religious composition of the country was extremely versa-
tile, at the same time, the Hungarian–Croatian relationship was not bur-
dened by ethnic minority problems, because only a limited number of ethnic 
minorities lived in both countries. 
After 1933 – especially following 1938 –, the neighbourhood connec-
tions were mostly shaped by (the relationship to) Germany in the region of 
Hungary. The small states were competing against each other and were used 
 37
against one another to some extent, at the same time, they tried to exceed 
each other in meeting the demands of Germany. This way they were practi-
cally enemies to one another, however, their connections to Germany made 
them allies. This situation is perfectly reflected by the saying of the time 
which depicted these circumstances as the “misery of the small states”. 
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6. The dilemma of the loser Hungary and the victorious 
great powers, 1944-1948 
 
In March 1944, Germany invaded Hungary. Although the head of state 
could keep his position, Horthy’s possibilities to influence the political 
processes were rather limited. The Hungarian government in reality only 
executed the demands of the Germans, the real sovereignty of Hungary 
ceased to exist. 
In 1944, Hungary became a buffer zone in the fights of the world powers 
and the European powers, the fronts of the battles remained in the territory 
of Hungary for months. After September 1944, the present territory of Hun-
gary was divided between the areas of German occupation and the Soviet 
“liberation”. The zone of the Soviet influence gradually grew the territories 
under the control of the Germans and the allied Hungarian forces shrank day 
after day. 
The turn of 1944 and 1945 was one of the most tragic times in the history 
of the divided Hungary (divided by territorial, power and ideological re-
spects). Such a confusion of  (partly legitimised) values and the denial of the 
same values were present in Hungary that had never been experienced in the 
previous history of the country. 
The attempts of Hungary to “jump out” were all unsuccessful, so the 
country found itself among the losers at the end of the war, which was a 
negative fact in the eyes of all the dominant international actors in the given 
period of time. 
In December 1944, the Contemporary National Assembly was founded in 
the territory occupied by the Soviet Union, them the Contemporary National 
Government was created, too. This government declared war on the fascist 
Germany and in January 1945 it made a cease-fire agreement with the So-
viet Union and the Allied Powers. 
The agreement was actually the ratification of a limited sovereignty, and 
the Allied Control Commission was founded for the implementation and su-
pervision of the lines of the agreement. (This body operated until September 
1947, the deposition of the peace treaty of Paris.) The cease-fire agreement 
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also contained that the state borders as of 31 December 1937 were consid-
ered as standard (BALOGH, S. 1988). 
In the conference held at Yalta in February 1945, the “Yalta world order” 
was created. It basically determined the long-term frameworks of the devel-
opment and the possibilities of the politico-geographical position of Europe, 
including Hungary. The bases of the potential division of Europe were laid 
down in Yalta, although not put down in international contracts, only in in-
formal, verbal agreements, which, however, were respected by all parties for 
a long while. 
By April 1945, the whole territory of Hungary was under a Soviet occu-
pation. Publicly the Soviet Union consistently stated that it did not want to 
interfere into the internal socio-economic order of Hungary, but the pres-
ence of the Red Army, the Soviet leadership and dominance of the Allied 
Control Commission in themselves basically influenced the inner develop-
ment of Hungary, including the sphere of action of the Hungarian foreign 
policy. 
The British and American concepts of the creation of new states by the 
division of Germany (e.g. the South German State with Vienna as the capi-
tal city, which would have involved Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg, Austria 
and Hungary) failed (ROMSICS, I. 1998). The Soviet Union had no interest 
in the creation of state formations that it was unable to influence. Also, in 
the territories occupied by the Soviet Union, the different attempts of federa-
tion – which were stated with different objectives and according to different 
political values –, were not supported by the Soviet Union (GYARMATI, 
GY. 1992). 
During the preparation of the peace treaty to be made with Romania, in 
connection with Hungary a debate around Transylvania happened among 
the winners after September 1945. All the interested parties were under the 
influence of the experiences collected before and during the war. The USA 
were more willing to accept some correction of the borders drawn at Tri-
anon (although it would not accept completely the 2nd Vienna Award), but 
finally the opinion of the Soviet Union was given priority and the whole of 
Transylvania remained within the borders of Romania. 
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In Hungary, there were significant political powers interested in the crea-
tion of the “last henchman” image. This image served the political and his-
torical defaming of the inner bourgeois forces, and the manipulation of the 
foreign relations and the external image of Hungary. This label became an 
element in the negative self-image of a part of the Hungarian society, con-
tributing to the inner moral decay of the Hungarian society. 
The parliamentary elections held in November 1945 were won with an 
overwhelming majority (57%) by the Smallholders Party that also included 
bourgeois powers, but the party was unable to realise its political victory 
achieved at the elections in either the home or the foreign policy of the coa-
lition government. The situation following the elections well demonstrated 
the narrow sphere of action of the inner forces when their efforts did not fir 
clearly into the Soviet concepts. 
During the preparation of the peace and the settling of the relationships 
with the neighbouring countries, it soon became clear that there was no 
winning great power with a dominant interest in Hungary, which would 
have made them defend under all circumstances the interests of Hungary. 
The loser country, Hungary did not receive any support from the great pow-
ers for the assertion of its interests. 
Churchill’s speech held at Fulton (5 March 1946) “anticipated” in a sense 
the forthcoming processes, but the speech might have also included “be-
tween the lines” that Churchill could clearly see the consequences of his 
dealings with Stalin about the interest zones in Central and Southeast 
Europe. The anticipations stated in the speech were soon justified by the his-
tory of the era and the region. 
As opposed to the neighbouring countries recognized as winners (Yugo-
slavia and Czechoslovakia), and partly the sooner “escaped” state (Roma-
nia) and the one that was treated specially, because it was considered as the 
first victim (Austria), Hungary had weak positions of negotiation. By the 
acquisition of Sub-Carpathia, the Soviet Union became a direct neighbour to 
Hungary. There was practically no basis for Hungary to asserts its interests 
against the neighbours. In many respects, Hungary was in a subordinate po-
sition compared to its neighbours, mostly because of the Soviet Union. 
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The relationships between Hungary and the neighbouring states were 
heavily burdened by the home political efforts of some countries. In their 
Košice programme announced in April 1945, the Czechoslovakian govern-
ment made the Hungarian minority responsible for the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian ethnic minority was deprived of practically 
all their rights. The mass executions and revenges in Yugoslavia in 1944-
1945 took some 40,000 Hungarian victims, the massacres of the Hungarians 
in Romania did not demand so many dead. 
The evacuations (of Germans) from Hungary, the formally bilateral 
(Hungarian– Czechoslovakian) evacuations of Hungarians from Slovakia, 
which were settled in agreement but in practice were mostly unilateral, 
made the relationship between the population of the countries go wrong in 
many respects. Such bad images of the neighbours emerged in the societies 
that made it very hard to create bilateral connections in the future. 
It became very important in the economic connections that the Soviet 
Union acquired the former German properties, also, the completion of the 
compensations made the role of the Soviet Union dominant in many re-
spects. In 1946, the Soviet Union achieved a key position in several strate-
gic sectors of the Hungarian economy. The Soviet Union became one of the 
strongest internal and external actors in the Hungarian economy at the same 
time. 
The Hungarian preparation of the peace took place within unfavourable 
circumstances, both with the respect to the home and foreign policy. The 
demands stated by certain parties and persons for border alterations based 
on ethnic grounds divided the Hungarian home political life, on the one 
hand, and burdened the relationships to the neighbour states, on the other. 
Nobody had any doubt that against the Soviet Union, Hungary would be un-
able to have the ethnically based borderlines realised at the peace talks. 
On 10 February 1947, Hungary finally signed a “usual” peace treaty of 
the defeated states in Paris, which further decreased the territory of Hungary 
with the Pozsony (now Bratislava) bridgehead. The peace treaty complied 
with the needs of the great powers and satisfied most of the demands of the 
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neighbouring states. For securing the tasks connected to the occupation of 
Austria, the Soviet Union could station troops in Hungary. 
The Truman doctrine announced in March 1947 on the enclosure of the 
Soviet Union and the stopping of world communism, opposite to its inten-
tions, accelerated the formation of the Hungarian dependence on the Soviet 
Union. The occasional uncertainties of the Soviet concepts about the status 
of Hungary were replaced by efforts aiming at the achievement of a clear 
alignment. 
During the debate on foreign policy in the Parliament in March 1947, the 
Hungarian political parties turned out to be basically divided about the issue 
of the orientation of the foreign policy. The majority felt that the world po-
litical ambitions of the Soviet Union and the western powers were “above 
us” and Hungary had no real chance to influence these processes. In the new 
world political situation, the “bridge role”, i.e. that Hungary should be a 
kind of intermediary between the “East” and the “West”, was stated parallel 
to the need for the declaration and enactment of the “eternal neutrality” of 
Hungary, while the left-wing parties wanted to deepen the relationship to 
the Soviet Union. 
At the announcement of the Marshal Plan in June 1947, Hungary was not 
in a situation either from home or foreign political aspects to accept the 
American assistance. Behind the decision, the integration of the foreign po-
litical efforts and the economic connections could be seen as clearly as 
never before. 
In the autumn of 1947, the theory of the two world systems was stated in 
the Soviet Union (Zdanew-doctrine), which modelled the division of the 
world in all respects. Zdanew  defined the USA as the lead power of the 
“imperialist camp”, while as the leader of the “socialist peace camp”, the 
Soviet Union. In Zdanew’s view, in this situation of the world politics, each 
state had to choose which camp to join. For Hungary, the possibilities of the 
“choice” were limited by the Soviet occupation. 
With signing the friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance pact 
with Yugoslavia (December 1947), the all-embracing settlement of the rela-
tionships to the neighbouring countries started. The Hungarian–Yugoslav 
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connections were the fastest developing among the neighbouring countries 
of Hungary, in fact, it was felt by many sometimes that the Yugoslav con-
nections were a kind of alternative against the Soviet Union. 
The friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance pact made with Ro-
mania (January 1948) and the Soviet Union (February 1948) settled the 
“orientation debate” in the field of foreign policy. Hungary had made con-
tracts with its dominant neighbours, which contained clear spatial and social 
alignments. 
By the summer of 1948, the internal political struggle had come to an 
end. The left-wing parties, especially the Hungarian Communist Party, en-
joying the support of the Soviet Union, received key positions in all re-
spects, and the later created Hungarian Workers’ Party had essentially a 
monopoly of power, by which it determined the further development of the 
country. 
From the summer of 1948, the connection between the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia gradually became tense, which was immediately reflected, al-
most as a mirror image, by the deterioration the Hungarian–Yugoslav bilat-
eral connections. It became evident that the Soviet Union dominated the for-
eign policy of the allied smaller states and defined their sphere of action. 
Along the Hungarian–Yugoslav border, a war psychosis could be felt for 
years, with a large number of minor border incidents. 
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7. In the alliance system of the Soviet Union, 1949-1991 
 
The whole of this period of time, its essential processes and turning 
points were determined by the relationship between the USA and the Soviet 
Union. In this divided situation of the world power and the competition of 
the super powers, Hungary was only in the foreground during the revolution 
of 1956. The “harmonised foreign policy” of the socialist countries always 
articulated primarily the purposes and interests of the Soviet Union, the 
sphere of action of the small states was strongly reduced, although it did not 
cease to exist. From the late 1960s, Hungary – driven by its real national in-
terests – was a factor relieving the tension between the world systems, later 
it became something like an intermediary. 
After the political turn in 1948, the politico-geographical position of 
Hungary was basically determined by the belonging to the socialist alliance 
system. The state borders (2 246 kms altogether) mostly connected Hungary 
to socialist countries (84.1%), within that, 56.9% were “alliance, military in-
tegration borders” after 1955. Only 15.9% of the length of the Hungarian 
state borders joined Hungary to Austria, whose border regions along Hun-
gary had been occupied by the Soviets before the signing of the Austrian po-
litical treaty, then Austria became neutral. By the temporary values, such a 
politico-geographical position of the country was seen as favourable. 
The politico-geographical position of most states in Central Europe was 
internationally determined in most aspects, but the given countries had par-
ticular and individual features, too (ENYEDI, GY. 1978). These features 
partly came from their different historical development, and partly from the 
ambitions of the current political leadership. 
 
 
7.1 The building out and questioning of the socialist alliance system, 
1949–1956 
 
In the classical period of the cold war, the relationship between the two 
alliance systems was defined by an open opposition. Both in Europe (1949 
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NATO, Germany) and in the Asian region (China, Korea), the relationship 
between the two great powers sharpened, and their different intentions were 
openly revealed. 
After the world political processes and the internal turn, Hungary was or-
ganically built into the power and economic structure of the Soviet Union, it 
became part of the “socialist camp”. It is worth noting that in 1949, it was 
the economic relationships that were laid down in an international treaty and 
organised into an international body: the COMECON was born (20. January 
1949), as an organisation for the economic co-operation of the socialist 
countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and the 
Soviet Union). 
The Hungarian–western (especially the Hungarian–American) connec-
tions were defined by the negative consequences deriving from the opposi-
tion of the two world systems. This was true both for the economic (political 
trials, expropriations) and the political connections (the closure of both 
Hungarian consulates by the American party). 
As a result of the multilateral compromise made by the great powers, 
Hungary became member of the UNO in December 1955. The membership 
in the given period of time only meant that Hungary could fulfil its socialist 
alignments to the socialist camp at this forum, too. Later the membership of-
fered a broader possibility to join the international processes. 
The Soviet economic, social, institutional etc. system was copied in Hun-
gary to almost 100%. In almost all sectors of the Hungarian economy, So-
viet advisors appeared, and the security–military structures of the country 
were re-built after the Soviet example, led by the Soviet advisors. The Hun-
garian–Soviet economic connections rapidly developed, and the Hungarian 
economy was in almost all respects linked to the bilateral connections. 
The COMECON set autarchy as an objective at the level of the organisa-
tion, as the preparation for World War III was an everyday topic. In addi-
tion, the strive for internal autarchy appeared in almost all of the small so-
cialist states. The preparation for the war led to such structural distortions, 
which determined the whole period of the state socialism. 
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Compared to the opposition of the two world systems, in most of the pe-
riod the neighbour state connections – with the exception of the Soviet Un-
ion, of course – were of secondary importance. 
− Among the socialist neighbour states, Czechoslovakia was the last 
with whom Hungary settled the relationships. The two countries signed the 
friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance pact in April 1949. (The two 
countries had joined the COMECON before the relationship between each 
other was settled.) This meant that the “alliance connection” was practically 
void of any content in the case of the smaller states, only the relationship to 
the Soviet Union had significance “within the camp”. 
− Romania made spectacular steps for the improvement of the situation 
of the Hungarian ethnic minority, thus the connection between the two 
countries developed better in this period (compared to the other states). The 
Hungarian minority was not a separating factor in the relationship between 
the two states yet. 
− The development of the Hungarian–Yugoslav connections was aston-
ishing in the first half of the 1950s. Along the border between the two coun-
tries, minor military conflicts were everyday affairs, and fortification works 
never seen before were implemented on both sides, especially in Hungary. 
− The regions of Austria bordering Hungary were under Soviet occupa-
tion until 1955, but the role of the invading power in home affairs was much 
more limited. The control of the Austrian border was extremely strict on the 
Hungarian side. A system of technical object was established, which made 
the “iron curtain” until 1989. 
The complete dependence on the Soviet Union, the sovietisation of the 
Hungarian society, the mass appearance of externals alien to the Hungari-
ans, the problems of provision after the deformation of the economic struc-
ture, the omnipresence of the personality cult and the deterioration of the 
public feeling first appeared in the internal socio–economic–political crisis 
in 1953. 
The signing of the Warsaw Treaty in 1955 cannot be separated from the 
Austrian political treaty, as the evacuation of the Soviet troops from Austria 
eliminated the legal grounds of their presence in Hungary, written down in 
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the Paris peace treaty. A new legitimacy was needed for the Hungarian stay 
of the Soviet troops. 
The foundation of the COMECON and the signing of the Warsaw Treaty 
created the institutional system that determined the intra-regional processes 
for decades (Figure 6.). Hungary became part of the socialist camp, and 
within that, the Soviet Union dominated the connections of Hungary. 
Although the correction of the crimes and mistakes committed during the 
building of the Socialism started in Hungary, it was a rather ambiguous 
process. From the summer of 1956 on, a significant part of the Hungarian 
society turned against the created structures, the former practice and the 
unlimited and one-sided dependence on the Soviet Union. 
The Hungarian revolution in October 1956 carried in almost all respects 
the consequences of the subtle development and new interests of the Hun-
garian society after 1945. The major part of the Hungarian society supported 
the values of the revolution, at the same time, there were societal forces in-
terested in the conservation of the status quo. 
As regards the foreign political orientation of Hungary, the most impor-
tant elements were the declaration of the secession from the Warsaw Treaty 
and of neutrality. The majority of the Hungarian society supported the new 
foreign political guidelines, but besides the declarations there was no power 
or possibility for the assertion of the decisions of the society. 
The short-armed fight for independence that emerged from the revolu-
tion, the struggle of the Hungarian troops against the Soviet Union was 
hopeless from military aspects, but its political and moral content, and its 
message had a long-term effect both in space and time. The Hungarian soci-
ety had to experience that the “West” remained inactive, all the support that 
the revolution got was nice talks, encouragement and humanitarian aids – 
the free world did not break “rules of the Yalta game”. 
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7.2 The interaction of the home and foreign policy (Hungary as the 
“most cheerful barrack” of the socialist camp) 
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The creation and maintenance of the “most cheerful barrack” image car-
ried both foreign and home political elements and determinations. As re-
gards home policy, it implied that the power sought a kind of compromise 
with the majority of the society, and as for foreign policy, it meant that the 
after 1956 the Hungarian leadership tried to alleviate and not aggravate the 
international conflicts during most of the period. 
After the Soviet intervention in November 1956, such a social aversion 
against the Soviet Union was born which determined for a long time the 
anti-Soviet feelings of the majority of the Hungarian society (although this 
could not be openly declared). At the same time, the internal political–
power consolidation cannot be understood without the disappointment 
which was triggered by the participation of the “West” in 1956, and the 
negative evaluation of that. 
The keeping of the “Hungarian issue” before the public eye in the UNO 
did not mean a real external pressure on the open and rough dictatorship in 
1957-1958. The dictatorship gradually became softer after the physical and 
legal showdowns. This kind of consolidation of the inner system created the 
possibilities for the acceptance of the system signed with the name of János 
Kádár by the West. 
From the 1960s, the formerly eliminated or frozen inter-state connections 
with the capitalist states of Europe (France, Great Britain) were gradually 
settled. After 1964, the settling and re-definition of the Hungarian–Austrian 
relationships accelerated. 
From the mid-1960s, a kind of internal acceptance of the socialist system 
was basically achieved. Following the economic reform attempts of 1968, 
the international recognition of the processes taking place in Hungary basi-
cally changed. These Hungarian processes were seen more and more posi-
tively in the West and with more and more reservations in the “East”. The 
Hungarian political leadership continuously had to “make excuses” for the 
inner economic reforms, however, in matters of foreign policy, they stuck to 
the “common directives”. 
The Hungarian participation in the military intervention in Czechoslova-
kia in 1968 worsened the developing bilateral connections with the Western 
 50
countries. With the support of the intervention, Hungary tried to save its 
own internal reforms, but in reality it did not improve the evaluation of the 
Hungarian reforms “within the camp”. 
The Hungarian–Romanian connections were influenced by the political 
favour done for János Kádár (the detention of Imre Nagy and his compan-
ions in Romania). The tensions gradually emerged between the two coun-
tries. The individual politics of Romania (towards China, Czechoslovakia 
and the USA) influenced the relationship less than the gradual worsening of 
the situation of the Hungarian minority living in Transylvania. The turns of 
the Romanian home policy sometimes created significant tensions in the 
connection between the two states. 
Within the relationships to the neighbours, the Hungarian–Austrian con-
nections became more and more specific. Both parties were able and wanted 
to demonstrate the political advantages of the policy of peaceful co-
existence of the different socio-economic systems. The improvement of the 
connections were also helped by the fact that Hungary gradually became a 
small socialist state with the most acceptable internal circumstances. 
When the Soviet–American connections grew colder, Hungary obtained a 
kind of intermediary role in the East–West relationships. Hungary had a 
vested interest in the easing of the tensions and the process of the extension 
and deepening of the European security and co-operation. The economic, fi-
nancial and political connections of Hungary gradually opened up towards 
the western countries. 
In 1973, the Hungarian Prime Minister made an official visit to the USA, 
which was meant to demonstrate that, the settlement of the Hungarian–
Ametican relationships started after 1956. (One prerequisite for this was the 
release of József Mindszenty, archbishop of Esztergom.) The Hungarian–
American connections were settled in almost all respects with the return of 
the Holy Crown in 1978 and the closing of the debates connected to the 
right of property. The ups and downs of the Soviet–American connection 
had a negative effect on the Hungarian–American connections, too, but 
these were no more “mirror translations” of the former. 
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The relationship with the socialist countries was particularly demon-
strated by the “socialist passport” introduced in 1972. The red passport was 
valid for five years, but only with a separate, special permission to Yugosla-
via (by Hungarian will) and the Soviet Union (by Soviet consideration). The 
introduction of the passport meant for the majority of the Hungarian citizens 
that a part of the socialist camp opened up for them. (Before 1972, the pos-
sibilities of individual travels to the socialist countries were rather limited. 
In the socialist “camp”, it was an alliance based on inter-state connections 
and not on the ones between the societies.) 
Induced by the energy crisis of 1973, a Yugoslav–Hungarian–
Czechoslovakian agreement was made in 1974 on the construction and joint 
use of the Adriatic petroleum pipeline. In the given situation, the construc-
tion of the pipeline was mostly an economic measure, but it also suggested 
the possibility of the decrease of the dependence on the Soviet energy in the 
future. 
The process of easing and the strives for the collective security of Europe 
were compatible with the Hungarian interest in all respects. The acceptance 
of the Helsinki Proclamation created favourable possibilities for the expan-
sion of the sphere of action of Hungarian foreign policy. (It is interesting 
that the Helsinki agreement further aggravated the inter-state and inter-party 
connections with Romania. The Romanian leadership – probably because of 
the worsening inner economic difficulties – consciously misunderstood and 
misinterpreted János Kádár’s speech held at Helsinki.) 
The intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979 made it 
even clearer – although it could not be a secret for the leaders of the smaller 
socialist states before, either – that the leaders of the Soviet Union acted 
primarily in accordance with their own geopolitical purposes and values, 
and paid but little attention to the short and longer term interests of its own 
allies. The bilateral worsening of the Soviet–American relationship and its 
negative economic effects were mostly suffered by the smaller socialist 
countries. 
Within the alliance system, Hungary was tied to the Soviet Union by a 
thousand links. These links started to develop in different ways in different 
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fields in the 1980s. There were minor disturbances in the political co-
operation every now and then, debates already occurred in the economic re-
lationships, mostly triggered by a stronger defence of the national interest of 
Hungary; at the same time, the firm military connections were almost con-
sidered as a taboo. 
The role of the Soviet Union was dominant even in the political connec-
tions within the socialist alliance system, also, the Soviet Union dominated 
the relationship of the individual states to it. In the Hungarian–Soviet politi-
cal connections there were no sharp conflicts which appeared to the public, 
only minor tensions and frictions occurred occasionally. These tensions 
were partly in connection with the different evaluations of the Hungarian 
economic reform steps and partly with the Hungarian demands for the in-
crease of the supply of oil. 
The Hungarian state and party leadership did not criticise publicly the po-
litical practice of the Soviet Union, but there were quite a few hard negotia-
tions between Leonid Bresnew  and János Kádár. After 1985, with the elec-
tion of Mikhail Gorbachew as secretary-general of the party, the former 
Hungarian reforms were more positively evaluated, however, there were 
reservations on the Hungarian side concerning the reforms of Gorbachew. 
The relationship of Hungary to the neighbouring socialist states was not 
free from conflicts in the 1980s, in fact, the relationship was rather tense 
with Romania, mostly because of the rapidly worsening situation of the 
Hungarian minority. In the case of the connections to Czechoslovakia, it had 
ups and downs, primarily because of the debates about the construction of 
the Danubian river barrage system and the development of the situation of 
the Hungarian minority. 
In the Hungarian–Yugoslavia connections – compared to the previous 
decades – a relative consolidation was dominant. Yugoslavia was engaged 
with solving its inner problems, struggling with the difficulties and contra-
dictions of the transition in the post-Tito era. 
The Hungarian economy organically integrated into the division of la-
bour of the COMECON, and especially of the Soviet Union. The socialist 
economic “commitment” gradually decreased, partly by the assertion of the 
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national interests and partly the gradual joining to the western world econ-
omy. 
The basic structure of the Hungarian foreign trade in 1985, measured 
with the total value of the turnover, was the following: the proportion of the 
socialist countries, within that the COMECON countries, was dominant 
both in import (54.4%) and export (58.6%); the share of the developed capi-
talist countries was significant: 38.5% and 30.8%, respectively; the third 
world countries only accounted for 7.1% of the Hungarian import and 
10.6% of the export. 
The most important foreign trade partner of Hungary was the Soviet Un-
ion, with a 30% share from import and 33.6% from export. This weight of 
the Soviet Union in the Hungarian foreign trade was based on both eco-
nomic and political–ideological grounds. Hungary’s second most important 
foreign trade partner was the Federal Republic of Germany, with an 11.4% 
share from import and 7.8% from export. 
In the second half of the 1980s, the development of the cross-border con-
nections appeared as a new element along the western and southwestern 
borders of Hungary. The counties along the western borders of Hungary 
gradually joined in the activity of the Alpine–Adriatic Working Community 
(first as observers, then as members). It is worth noting especially when we 
consider that Hungary was unable to develop cross-border connections with 
its socialist allies. Across the Hungarian–Soviet border, apart from the huge 
material flows of the foreign trade, there were no regional and social con-
nections. On the Soviet side of the Hungarian–Soviet border, a kind of “so-
cialist iron curtain” existed during the whole period. 
In 1989, the “non-rouble account” turnover was already dominant in the 
Hungarian import (61.6%), parallel to the sharp decline of the rouble-
account turnover (38.4%). In export, a similar “account rearrangement” took 
place, 62.2% of the total export was already non-rouble account. (Among 
the socialist states, the non-rouble account trade increased, although rouble 
account was still prevalent this year. The non-rouble account import from 
the Soviet Union amounted to 34 million USD, that of the Hungarian export 
239 million USD. As the secretary-general of the Hungarian Socialist 
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Workers’ Party, Károly Grósz almost demanded the shift to the complete 
dollar-account trade and the overall use of the world market prices.) 
Looking at the breakdown of the import by countries, the COMECON 
countries amounted to 36.9% in 1989, EEC countries to 29% and the EFTA 
countries to 13.8%, leaving little for the rest of the world (17.6%). The 
breakdown of the export by countries was slightly different (COMECON: 
41.8%, EEC: 24.8%, EFTA: 10.7%, rest: 22.7%). In the rouble-account 
trade, the proportion of the Soviet Union was still prevalent in 1989. By ter-
ritorial structure, the Hungarian foreign trade was mostly neighbour-
oriented –especially because of the Soviet Union – and thus naturally 
Europe-oriented. 
As regards military structures, Hungary was fully integrated into the or-
ganisation of the Warsaw Treaty, in reality the military doctrine of the So-
viet Union, and thus was subordinate to the Soviet Union. The Hungarian 
army was dependent upon the Soviet Union in all respects (technical supply, 
plan of operations etc.). 
The military political situation of Hungary was basically determined by 
its place in the regional structure and “enemy image” of the Warsaw Treaty, 
and by the Soviet geo-strategy. Within the alliance system, Hungary was 
considered as a southwestern European state by its strategic position. At the 
same time, from this aspect Hungary was not in the main front of the oppo-
sition between the two world systems, it was a “battlefield of secondary im-
portance”. (When the Russian troops left Hungary, they turned out to have 
accumulated such an amount of war technique, which showed that they had 
prepared for significant actions.) 
The stationing of the Southern Soviet Army in Hungary did not only 
mean an external oppression but also an internal one in some cases. The re-
gional distribution of the Soviet military objects (Figure 7.) clearly indicates 
that they prepared for an attack towards the West on the one hand (external 
application), on the other hand, the allocation of the Soviet ring around Bu-
dapest was very important (potential application for internal oppression). 
The Hungarian army was bigger in the number of troops but weaker in 
gun power than the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. The weakness and 
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outdated technical level of the Hungarian air force was especially striking 
compared to the Soviet air force stationed here. This structure indicates the 
potential helplessness of the country and the Hungarian army. 
The military connections remained stable until the moment of the sys-
temic change. In January 1988, the “Friendship 88” military exercises were 
organised, with the participation of Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and Soviet 
divisions. In accordance with the new European political, safety and military 
policy agreements, western observers were watching the manoeuvres all the 
time. In October 1988, the Military Council of the Armed Forces of the 
Warsaw Treaty Member States was seating in Budapest, and they looked at 
the possible consequences of the decrease in the military force. Following 
the counselling session – with the participation of western observers again – 
Hungarian–Soviet military exercises were done. 
In December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachew announced at the general assem-
bly of the UNO the start of the decrease of the number of troops in Hungary, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia. In November 1989, the ministers of defence of 
the Warsaw Treaty only negotiated in Budapest about the “creation of ade-
quate protection”. From this time on, there was a possibility for transform-
ing the Warsaw Treaty into a real defence organisation. 
 56
 57
In January 1990, as part of the actions designed to strengthen trust in 
Europe, the Hungarian–Canadian “Open Sky” military exercises “opened up 
the Hungarian air-space” for the pilots of a NATO country. 
Hungary, within its limited possibilities, played a pioneer role in the 
building of the East-West connections. Because of its geographical position 
and basic economic difficulties, Hungary had a vested interest in the im-
provement of the East-West connections. In the period of the tensions be-
tween the super powers, Hungary consciously tried to ease and not aggra-
vate these tensions. The Hungarian foreign policy was recognised for its 
consistent conflict-solving behaviour. 
Hungary was the first among the socialist countries to realise the impor-
tance of the European Economic Community, except for the German De-
mocratic Republic, which was in a specific situation because of the inner 
trade of the two Germanies. Hungary already negotiated – at professional 
level – with the EEC about the improvement of the conditions of trade as 
soon as in 1982. The enlarging EEC became more and more important in 
the Hungarian foreign trade. Hungary had a vested interest in the develop-
ment of the bilateral connections. 
The neighbourhood connections showed a particular situation in the last 
years of the socialism, if we look at them from the side of the “statistical 
permeability of the border”. Looking at the average length of state border 
per one road or railway border station, we can see that from this aspect – af-
ter 1988, in almost all respects –, the Austrian border was the most perme-
able, while the Soviet border the least so. With the introduction of the world 
passport in 1988, masses of Hungarians went to Austria for shopping pur-
poses, but Hungary could not neglect the safety expectations of the “social-
ist camp”, e.g. the “iron curtain” constructed on the border could only be 
broken down at the end of the historical period. The two governments made 
an agreement in February 1989 on the elimination of the sealing of the bor-
der, and the technical sealing was broken down within a few weeks after 
that. 
In summary, both internal and external processes and determinations 
contributed to the creation of the “most cheerful barrack” situation. The 
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dominant content of this category were the relatively high living standards 
compared to the other socialist states, the regulated but at the same time 
predictable freedom of movement for a major part of the society, and the 
safety of public provision. 
The external conditions for the birth of the “most cheerful barrack” were 
to a large extent provided by the improvement of the relationship between 
the two super powers and world systems. The Hungarian political leadership 
– for their own and Hungary’s interests – always followed a foreign political 
direction easing the tensions both during the times of friendship and hostil-
ity. 
 
 
c) From the economic crisis through the social crisis to the political 
systemic change 
 
The aggravating difficulties of the Hungarian economy were to a large 
extent the consequences of the negative effects of the change of paradigm in 
the world economy and the deficiencies of adaptability. The Hungarian 
economy reacted late and at the cost of huge economic losses to the vast re-
arrangement processes in the world. 
By the late 1970s, the possibilities for the economic growth became 
rather limited. Parallel to the increase of the amount of foreign debts, the 
economic–financial connections of Hungary to the West partially changed, a 
financial dependence gradually appeared. Hungary’s application for the 
membership of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in No-
vember 1981 should be considered as the recognition of the economic hard-
ships and not as the first sign of a new political orientation. From this time 
on, the economic situation and solvency of Hungary received a wider home 
and international publicity. 
The introduction of the emergency situation in Poland and the discussion 
of its consequences gave a new momentum to the Hungarian intellectuals to 
asses the situation, and the need of the so-called “Finlandisation” was 
gradually stated. Although they had no real chance for a broader analysis of 
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the topic, the need for the loosening of the Hungarian–Soviet connections 
received more and more attention outside the official circles. 
The evident presence of the economic difficulties disintegrated the net of 
the internal compromises that had been achieved and seemed as a kind of 
national consensus. Before 1985, within the frameworks of the openly not 
(yet) questionable single-party system, the statements of the political leader-
ship were considered as the only assessments of and influences on the situa-
tion of Hungary. (From the underground existence, many things could al-
ready be questioned at that time, as the first volume of the newspaper called 
“Beszélõ” [“Parlour”] was published in October 1982.) 
At the new-system elections held in 1985, 25 representatives who got 
into the Parliament were not nominated by the Patriotic People’s Front. 
Among the MP-s, 77% were still members of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party, but the elections created the personality conditions for the 
appearance of a more critical group (which could not be called an opposition 
at that time, however). 
The voluntaristic attempt made at the acceleration of the economic 
growth, given the outdated economic structure, drove Hungary to the brink 
of insolvency by 1988: the amount of foreign debts reached 18 billion USD. 
The stock of debts turned into a self-inducing process of indebtedness. 
With the discussion in Monor in 1985, the quasi-public organisation of 
the forces of opposition started. The versatility of the programmes and ef-
forts was given from the very first moments of the start. After 1985 – paral-
lel to the deepening of the economic crisis and the gradual extension of po-
litical publicity – the process of the reconsideration of the national affairs 
(first the river barrage system on the Danube), and their assessment quite 
different from the official standpoints started, as well as the public confron-
tation of the different opinions. 
After 1986, on constitutional grounds, the establishment of different al-
ternative associations and organisations started. Some of these organisations 
still accepted the political umbrella offered by the Patriotic People’s Front 
(e.g. the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendly Society), but in the draft of the 
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programme declaration, radically new claims were stated concerning the in-
ternational situation of Hungary: 
− back to Europe (the Hungarian nation, as a sovereign state should be 
able to freely join again the political, moral and economic community of the 
European peoples and states, and the European culture); 
− Central European integration (the nations in Central Europe, on the 
grounds of mutual benefits, without any external intervention, should make 
an economic and political alliance to allow the democratic solution of any 
ethnic minority issue); 
− a single Hungarian nation (all the Hungarians – 16 million of them – 
should be part of a single Hungarian nation. The Hungarian government has 
to represent the minorities at the international forums); 
− an independent Hungary (Hungary, on the ground of the present na-
tional interests, should reconsider the system of its international connections 
created during the Stalinist era). 
The social organisations gradually widened, movements (Hungarian De-
mocratic Forum) and federations (Federation of the Young Democrats, Alli-
ance of the Free Democrats) appeared, which were not called parties but 
were parties in reality. These political formations also dealt with the foreign 
policy orientation of Hungary, without any prior commitments. 
The Hungarian refugees fleeing from Romania, the ethnic minority pol-
icy and the so-called settlement systematisation programme in Romania 
evoked demonstrations which did not only question the “alliance” of the two 
countries but gradually started to carry the critique of the Hungarian politi-
cal system, as well. 
The party conference held in 1988, with the removal of János Kádár, 
brought fundamental personality changes in the leadership of the HSWP, 
but in most of the issues no consensus could be achieved within the party. 
The labelling of the tragedy of 1956 as popular rising by Imre Pozsgay 
questioned the legitimacy of not only the party but also of those persons 
who were active participants in breaking down the popular rising. In fact, 
there were not only historical but also hard power and personal debates con-
cerning the issue of 1956, not only in the society but also within the party. 
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The leading organs of the HSWP approved of the introduction of the 
multi-party system in February 1989. From this time on, the building out of 
the politically achieved, legally legitimised, real multi-party system acceler-
ated. 
One of the most essential issues of the political party programmes and 
declarations published in 1989 was the reconsideration of the alliance con-
nections of Hungary, as well as the assessment of the possibilities and con-
strains. Each significant force had to confront with the issue of the Warsaw 
Treaty and the COMECON. In real political approach, most parties consid-
ered the reform of these organisations as a minimum purpose, and the “ap-
proved” secession of Hungary as a maximum one. In most political declara-
tions, the support of the neutrality of Hungary was present. Several parties 
stated the need for the simultaneous elimination of the NATO and the War-
saw Treaty, and the creation of a collective European security system. 
In June 1989, the National Round Table talks started about the present 
and future of Hungary. The stake was the peaceful, compromise-based 
transformation. The main focuses of the negotiations were home political is-
sues, but there were debates on the orientation of the Hungarian foreign pol-
icy, too. 
The Hungarian government, by “letting go” the refugees of the GDR in 
September, clearly broke with the former political practice of the socialist 
states. The “mass opening of the iron curtain” had an international effect 
and affected the internal circumstances of the GDR. 
At the 16th congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, organ-
ised in 6-10 October 1989, the HSWP dissolved itself without a legal suc-
cessor, and the Hungarian Socialist Party was founded. The dissolution of 
the former state party created a new situation for everybody. The HSP was 
forced into a political competition in the new situation, carrying the burden 
of the political past of its leaders. 
The democratic transitions taking place in the neighbouring socialist 
countries questioned the very essence of the former economic, political and 
military structures, and the unity of the “socialist camp”. 
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In the sphere of action of the Hungarian foreign policy, a new element 
was the possibility to deepen the inter-state co-operations with Yugoslavia, 
Italy and Austria. The neutral Austria, the non-committed Yugoslavia, the 
NATO member Italy and Hungary belonging to the Warsaw Treaty con-
ducted consultations at high level about the tighter economic and political 
collaboration of the countries in the region. In addition to this initiative, it is 
worth noting that the government handed in Hungary’s application to join 
the Council of Europe. 
In March 1990, the Hungarian and the Soviet governments made an 
agreement upon the complete evacuation of the Soviet troops stationed in 
Hungary. After the signing of the agreement, the evacuation of the troops 
started almost immediately. The start of the evacuation also carried a home 
political message, namely that the Hungarian Socialist Party was able to re-
store the national sovereignty and the foreign political representation of the 
independent country. 
In the election campaign of 1990, a cardinal issue was the orientation of 
the Hungarian foreign policy and the issue of Hungary’s neutrality. Looking 
at the detailed opinions of the different parties about the foreign policy and 
the alliance policy, we can see that there was a broad agreement among the 
parties in the following issues: 
− the Hungarian sovereignty has to be restored; 
− Hungary has to return to Europe. 
In April, the heads of state and prime ministers of Czechoslovakia, Po-
land and Hungary negotiated about the extension of the co-operation among 
the transforming democracies. In reality, this was when the process of the 
construction of the “Visegrád Group” started. The basic issue was the har-
monisation of the common participation of the Warsaw Treaty’s more de-
veloped, western countries, more advanced in the democratic transforma-
tion, with the potential leadership of Poland. 
In the last decade of the state socialism, the economic and political crisis, 
and the systemic crisis were connected to each other and became a self-
inducing process. The previous internal social consensus and legitimacy 
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ceased to exist, and the rearrangements in the world policy amplified the 
processes of the search for a new orientation. 
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8. Hungary in the “grey zone” 
(Out of the Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON – but 
where?) 
 
The changes of the economic, social, political and power structure of 
Hungary were parallel to the global transformation of the former world sys-
tem. The European structures significantly changed and the former alliance 
system ceased to exist. The shaping “grey zone” brought a new sphere of ac-
tion, a kind of liberty, new responsibilities and challenges, and also fears for 
Hungary. 
At the multi-party parliamentary election of 1990, the Hungarian Democ-
ratic Forum won (with 156 mandates out of the 376), but they did not 
achieve an absolute majority. After the foundation of the new Parliament – 
before the new government entering into office – the revision of the rela-
tionship between Hungary and the Warsaw Treaty, and the necessity of the 
settling of the situation were almost immediately put in the schedule. The 
Parliament rejected the possibility of the unilateral secession and asked the 
new government to start negotiations on the secession. 
The Hungarian Democratic Forum was only able to found a government 
with its coalition partners (Independent Smallholders Party and the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party). The foreign policy part of the government pro-
gramme was real political one inasmuch as the new government declared 
that it respected the previous international contracts, at the same time, it set 
new objectives according to the new political situation, giving priority to the 
efforts aiming at the European integration. 
The co-operation of the countries in the Adriatic–Danubian region was 
given a new emphasis after the Hungarian elections (Pentagonale). The “in-
ter-block” formation played an important role in maintaining the stability in 
the region; it showed a direct political support for the democratic transfor-
mation by the West. 
The Hungarian Parliament made a very important declaration both from 
home and foreign political aspect on 31. May 1990, the 70th anniversary of 
the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty. The Parliament stated that it con-
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sidered the state borders of Hungary as realistic, and it wished to shape the 
neighbourhood connection of the country on this ground. 
Hungary joined the EFTA (June 1990), took up the diplomatic relations 
with the NATO (July 1990), the European Economic Community opened its 
embassy in Budapest (November 1990). The creation of the diplomatic rela-
tions between the NATO, the EEC and Hungary, still a member of the 
COMECON and the Warsaw Treaty, was a recognition and a kind of sup-
port of the foreign policy of the new Hungarian government. 
In September 1990, the Hungarian government contributed to the GDR’s 
secession from the Warsaw Treaty. As a consequence of the creation of the 
German unity, this measure was logical in all respects, at the same time it 
reinforced the basis of the legal perception of Hungary, i.e. the possibility of 
secession from the treaty. In October, the Hungarian government reinforced 
its wish to secede from the military organisation of the Warsaw Treaty until 
the end of 1991. (Thus the need to secede completely from the organisation 
was not mentioned yet at that time.) 
In January 1991, Hungary participated with ambulance units in the action 
called “Desert Storm” against Iraq, which aimed at the elimination of the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The action took place under the auspices of the 
UNO, but in effect using the military power of the USA. Hungary demon-
strated its new international sphere of action and also its commitment to the 
western values. 
The new government paid a greater attention than ever before to improv-
ing the situation of the Hungarian ethnic minorities living beyond the bor-
ders of Hungary. The statement of the Prime Minister, József Antall, that he 
wished to be “the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians in spirit”, signed 
the start of the elaboration of a new national policy, and the foreign policy 
became an executive of this policy. The neighbourhood policy to a large ex-
tent was identical with issue of the Hungarian minorities, especially in Ro-
mania. 
The Hungarian relationships towards the EEC and the NATO gradually 
strengthened. It was not a “double-dealing” policy but the quest for the op-
portunities in an extremely complicated international and internal situation. 
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The USA and Western Europe themselves were not prepared for such de-
velopments, such rapid transitions in the East. The approach to Europe was 
indicated by the fact that Hungary became a full-power member of the 
Council of Europe. 
In the neighbourhood policy, the Hungarian–Czechoslovakian relation-
ship was still affected by the issue of the hydroelectric station at Bõs, in 
fact, the disagreements were deepened by the Czechoslovakian announce-
ment in January 1991 of continuing the constructions in their own territory. 
The result of these works was the diversion of the Danube River. (The case 
was taken to the International Court at the Hague, but the decision of the 
court in itself did not solve the tensions of the different objectives and types 
of actions of the two countries.) 
In February 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary signed a co-
operation agreement. The co-operation of the Visegrád countries was an at-
tempt to fill out a political–power vacuum, but Poland was too weak in all 
respects to become a recognized, leading factor in the region. 
At the special meeting of the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw 
Treaty in Budapest on 25. February, the previous military contracts were 
considered as null and void, in addition, it was stated that the military or-
ganisation of the Warsaw Treaty would cease to exist as of 31. March 1991. 
On 19. June, the last Soviet soldier left the territory Hungary. 
On 28. June 1991, Hungary approved of the elimination of the 
COMECON, and this way its economic relationships not only to the ex 
member states but also to all regions changed. A few days after that, a deci-
sion was made on the complete elimination of the Warsaw Treaty, and not 
only its military institutional system. On 1. July 1991, Hungary became a 
free country in all respects, outside any block, outside any economic inte-
gration, and without the presence of any foreign troops. 
The tension in the Yugoslav region, which gradually turned to a civil war 
after August 1991, had a negative effect on the relationship between Hun-
gary and Yugoslavia. The debates were especially sharp about the shipment 
of arms from Hungary to Croatia, later the armed violations of the frontier 
by Yugoslavia. 
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Parallel to the transformation of the neighbourhood environment, in No-
vember 1991 Hungary signed the association treaty with the EEC. The sign-
ing of this association treaty was of vital importance for the collaboration 
between Hungary and the EEC, as Hungary now had a contractual relation-
ship with the EEC, which, although does not lead to the actual membership, 
can be considered as the first step in the process of the accession. 
The attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, then the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union in December of the same year created a funda-
mentally new situation for Hungary. With the birth of the independent 
Ukraine and the new Russia, and the establishment of the CIS, new state 
structures, new power relations and a new system of interests were created 
along the northeastern borders of Hungary and in the wider eastern region. 
The new stresses in the neighbourhood policy are indicated by the fact 
that Hungary was among the first ones to recognize the independence of 
Croatia and Slovenia on 15. January 1992, and established the diplomatic 
relations with the new neighbours. Hungary stressed its neutrality in the 
Yugoslav crisis (especially because of the Hungarian population of the Va-
jdaság/Voivodina area), but actually it sympathised with the Croatian and 
Slovenian efforts, and supported them as far as it was possible. 
The Hungarian–Sereb relations were not only burdened by these meas-
ures of Hungary, but also the fact that Hungary joined the punitive sanctions 
initiated by the international community. During the control of the sanc-
tions, new relations were created between Hungary and the Western Euro-
pean integrational organisations. (Hungary suffered a great financial loss, 
but politically gained a lot with the keeping of these sanctions. However, the 
real winners were the Hungarian and Yugoslav smugglers living in the bor-
der region.) 
The Hungarian government wanted to settle its relations to its 
neighbours, the successor states of the Soviet Union, and its most important 
partners. The first document of this type was the treaty between Hungary 
and Germany, signed in February 1992. This was followed by the Hungar-
ian–Lithuanian, the Hungarian–Croatian and the Hungarian–Ukrainian trea-
ties. (This latter was questioned by many, which led to an internal crisis of 
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the coalition, and the government was only able to have it passed by a few 
votes from the opposition.) 
With the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in January 1993, a new state 
and a new situation emerged along the northern borders of Hungary, too. 
The proportion of the Hungarian minority increased within the new borders 
of Slovakia, which did not solve but in many aspects complicated the rela-
tionship between the two countries. 
In summary, the neighbourhood environment of Hungary was fundamen-
tally rearranged in the early 1990s (see Figure 8. and Table 3.). The posi-
tions of Hungary definitely strengthened compared to the new successor 
states. The majority of the Hungarian society and the political elite showed a 
great self-control in connection with the transition processes going on in the 
neighbouring states, and this self-control was typical of the major part of the 
Hungarian minority living in the neighbouring countries, as well. Hungary 
and the Hungarian populations were seen as a factor in the stability of the 
region. 
The free trade association made between the neighbouring states 
(CEFTA) meant both the appearance of new chances and forms of co-
operation and – especially as concerns the export of agricultural products – 
the open conflict and awkward management of the different interests. Still, 
the CEFTA plays a positive role within the connections of the ex-socialist 
countries, because it gives an opportunity for the experience and handling of 
some expected consequences of the EU integration. 
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Table 3 
 
Hungary and neighbouring countries, 1993 
 
Country Territory 
(km2) 
Population 
(million) 
GDP/capita 
(USD) 
Ratio of 
state nation 
Number of 
Hungarians 
(thousand) 
Hungary 93030 10.3 3300 92% 10,222 
Austria 83859 7.9 23120 93% 16,000 
Croatia 56538 4.8 2020 75% 26,000 
Romania 237500 22.8 1120 89% 1,598 
Slovakia 49036 5.4 1900 86% 567,000 
Slovenia 20253 2.0 6310 88% 10,000 
Ukraine 603700 52.1 1350 73% 155,000 
Yugoslavia 248987 10.7 900 62% 385,000 
 
 
 
 70
 
 
 71
 
9. At the door of the NATO, in the waiting room of the 
European Union 
 
The new socialist–liberal parliamentary majority after the elections of 
1994 was a large-scale continuity as regards the foreign policy orientation of 
Hungary, it was only the neighbourhood relations where something changed 
– which is not to say that new efforts were pursued, maybe the attitude 
changed slightly. The Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Slovak treaties 
made by the new coalition served both the settling of the bilateral connec-
tions and the Hungarian efforts to become a NATO and a European Union 
member state. The new socialist–liberal coalition continued, in fact, it accel-
erated the preparation for both the NATO and the EU accession. 
 
 
 
9.1 At the door of the NATO 
 
Within the new global and continental circumstances, the issue of the 
enlargement of the NATO naturally raised and still raises the question of the 
security of Ukraine and Russia. The programme called “Partnership for 
Peace” was a kind of need for the strengthening of the trust in January 1994. 
As the Treaty wanted to prove that it did not consider as enemies the two, 
militarily most powerful successor states of the Soviet Union, it had to inte-
grate them in some way within the frameworks of the common security sys-
tem. The special contractual relationship made with the two countries gave a 
kind of minimum guarantee for the two Soviet successor states. 
Among the small ex-socialist countries, a sort of natural competition 
started for getting in the first round of the NATO enlargement. The mem-
bership was mostly an external guarantee of the security, on the other hand, 
a high-level recognition of the internal democratisation for those who were 
striving for the accession. 
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The decision of the NATO in July 1997 on the invitation of the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary was basically the sign of the inner compro-
mise of the member states, also, the recognition to some extent of the de-
mocratic development that had taken place in these three countries. 
The NATO membership of Hungary, after the successful referendum and 
the completion of the ratification procedure by the member states, was 
achieved in March 1999. In the present political and military constellation, 
and in the complicated economic interest system, Hungary became a NATO 
member sooner than it is acceded to the European Union. In the beginning 
of the internal transformation process, the opposite situation seemed to be 
more possible. 
Hungary is in a very special situation in the present territorial structure of 
the NATO, it is an “inland island”, given that it has no common inland bor-
der with any of the present member states. This isolated location will not be 
a problem if the NATO orientation policy of Slovenia is continued, which 
seems to be the case, also, if a similar effort takes place by Slovakia after 
the elections in 1998. (The internal political debate of Austria abut the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the eternal neutrality and the NATO mem-
bership will probably last for years.) 
Hungary belongs to the Southern Headquarters of the NATO – which in-
creases the importance of Slovenia –, and this connection will probably ex-
ert its effects in other respects, too. Hungary as a NATO member is situated 
close the location of the protracting Bosnian crisis, and the air-base of 
Taszár will be an important logistic centre in the coming period of time. 
The NATO membership does not affect the sovereignty of Hungary for-
mally (not all of the military and political consequences of the accession are 
automatic), but in practice, every new connection and every issue of the se-
curity policy is given a new emphasis now that Hungary is within the 
Treaty. 
The most important interest of Hungary, beyond its own security, is that 
Romania and Slovakia, in addition to Slovenia, should also be integrated 
within the treaty in the second round. The security of the country would in-
crease thereby, also, the major part of the Hungarian ethnic minority would 
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belong to one alliance system and share the same democratic political val-
ues. 
 
9.2 In the waiting room of the European Union 
 
The European Union reached a new era of its history by the late 1990s. It 
has to give an answer to the questions of the deepening of the integration, 
the introduction of the common currency and all its operational experiences 
gathered so far. All of this has to be achieved within such circumstances 
when new efforts of the assertion of national interests within the EU 
emerge. 
In the Luxembourg summit of the EU held in December 1997, the circle 
of the countries invited for the accession negotiation was settled, and Hun-
gary became a part of the 5+1 formation. The accession negotiations and the 
enlargement itself were of secondary importance compared to the imple-
mentation of the inner reform. This situation has far-leading consequences, 
and not only for Hungary. 
The accession negotiations with the European Union can last for a long 
time, and the former date in the “ hypothesis of the accession works”, 2002, 
might be prolonged with a number of years. The chances of this are 
strengthened day after day by the different involvements and interests of the 
EU countries in the enlargement, and because of their increasing conflicts of 
interests. 
The foreign trade relations of Hungary are already dominated by the EU, 
thus the accession – despite the visible and invisible risks of both parties – is 
urgent from this respect. However, it is also the long-term interest of Hun-
gary to join a well-functioning EU with a clear structure and clear objec-
tives. 
With the NATO membership and hopefully the European Union mem-
bership within a foreseeable future, Hungary will definitely become part of 
the Euro-Atlantic integration organisations and processes. By these proc-
esses, Hungary turns from “the West of the East to the East of the West”, 
and not only in a topographical sense. 
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10 Summary 
 
The politico-geographical and geopolitical situation of a country is de-
termined by external (world political, continental and neighbourhood) and 
internal factors. The external environment in the broader sense means those 
general conditions within which the internally defined, legitimised purposes 
and interests can range. The internal legal and social legitimacy is especially 
important in the field of the “alliance connections”, but can also be seen in 
the field of the “enemy image”, too. 
Until World War I, the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, as one of the tradi-
tional great powers of Europe, was part of the European power equilibrium. 
The relationship of the Monarchy towards the other great powers could de-
velop in several different ways. 
The alliance system of the Central Powers, including the Monarchy, was 
defeated in World War I. The Monarchy, as a joint effect of the war defeat 
and the secession efforts of its ethnic minorities, disintegrated. 
Hungary restored its territorial sovereignty, but had to face the secession 
of the ethnic minorities of the historical Hungary and the promises of the 
winners made during the war. Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and 
population, in a way that one-third of the Hungarian ethnic group was given 
to the successor states. 
In the period between the two world wars, Hungary acted, more exactly 
struggled within the constraints of and possibilities for creating the condi-
tions for the achievement of the socially defined and legitimised purpose, 
the territorial revision. Hungary had no power position, weight and possibil-
ity at all for the implementation of this objective on its own, thus it neces-
sarily was connected to those countries which questioned the former peace 
treaty. 
During World War II, both the real politics and the ideological barriers 
appeared in the foreign policy of Hungary. As regarded the Soviet Union, 
the ideological barrier was dominant, even when the territorial claims of 
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Hungary went hand in hand with those of the Soviet Union (in connection 
with Romania). 
After the defeat in World War II, both the old and the new political 
forces had to accept the fact that the territory of Hungary was liberated by 
the Soviet Union, and the Red Army was present in the Hungarian territory. 
The Soviet Union dominated even the internal processes, partly through the 
Hungarian Communists and partly directly. 
The belonging of Hungary to the socialist alliance system was mostly a 
connection to the leading power of the alliance, the Soviet Union, and the 
bilateral relationships with the other member states were of secondary im-
portance. Both the Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON were actually sin-
gle-pole organisations, despite the formal declaration of the equality of the 
member states. The essence of both organisations, especially that of the 
military one, was dominated by the situation coming from the size and 
world political position of the Soviet Union. 
The bipolar world after World War II, the divided Europe, and the oppo-
sition of the capitalist and socialist systems and military blocks developed 
with ups and downs after 1975 – starting from the acceptance of the Hel-
sinki Proclamation –, but the tendency was the decrease of the opposition. 
The economic and political crisis of the socialist countries bore new dan-
gers after the 1980s, but the conflict of the two world systems ceased to ex-
ist in reality, as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The transition period was mostly determined by the world powers and the 
world policy, the possibilities of Hungary to influence it was limited. In the 
new situation that emerged from the late 1980s, the possibilities of Hungary 
fundamentally changed. From 1990 on, a new situation gradually appeared 
around and for Hungary. The elimination of the Warsaw Treaty, the evacua-
tion of the Soviet troops, the disintegration of the COMECON, as well as 
the internal socio-economic and political transformation, the elimination of 
the former political institutional system and the systemic change – these all 
offered new possibilities for Hungary to shape its internal conditions and its 
international relations. 
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During this decade, the Hungarian state socialist system, as a conse-
quence of the external and internal transformations, was first questioned, 
and then it failed at the democratic, multi-party elections of 1990. This date 
is one of the most important turning points of this period of history, as it es-
tablished the independence of Hungary, outside any military block. 
Not only the world political environment of Hungary changed basically, 
but its European connections, and also its neighbourhood relations were es-
sentially transformed. Hungary had already established connections towards 
the Western European integration organisations, and in the new situation the 
Hungarian political leadership and public opinion defined as a basic objec-
tive and value the accession to the transforming European Union, and 
started the conscious preparation for the accession process and the expected 
membership. 
The changes taking place in the neighbourhood of Hungary can be seen 
in the disintegration of the former socialist federations and an increase in the 
number of independent neighbour states. The newly independent states 
(Slovakia, Ukraine, Croatia and Slovenia) have less weight than their prede-
cessor states in many respects, increasing the sphere of action of Hungary in 
its neighbourhood environment. The development processes of the the 
neighbouring states were burdened by uncertainties, especially the civil wars 
raging in the Yugoslav region raised security challenges for Hungary, at the 
same time, these bloody events accelerated the convergence of Hungary and 
the NATO. 
The accession to the Euro-Atlantic military organisation (in March 1999) 
basically changed the external security policy situation of Hungary. Hun-
gary is now within the frameworks of the European stability. 
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